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For many Americans, especially those old enough to remember it, the Vietnam
War remains a source of deep emotional conflict even today, nearly twenty years
after its end. Not only was Vietnam an extremely unpopular war, inciting fierce
antiwar sentiment both at home and abroad, it was also a very costly war in
terms of human life. From 1964 to 1973 the United States, the world's greatest
military power, committed itself to a war that it could not win. Thousands of
Americans lost their lives in the jungles of Vietnam, and thousands more returned
home with physical and emotional scars that refused to heal. Vietnam remains
a difficult subject for Americans for a number of reasons. For the first time, a
war involving U.S. soldiers was brought home via television to nearly every
American citizen on the nightly news.' In addition, Vietnam was the first exposure
of American troops to an unconventional war and the ruthless methods of guerrilla
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1. Hearts and Minds, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 15, 1985, at 64. George Jacobson, Special Assistant
to the U.S. ambassador during the 1968 Tet offensive, offers the "Jacobson rule," which he claims
America violated in Vietnam. The rule has three elements:
first is never, ever, ever, ever become involved in a "limited war," because the other
side may not have the same definition of that term as you do. We were fighting a
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warfare. Most importantly, however, the Vietnam War is considered by many
to be the only war that the United States has ever lost.
As the American people continue to struggle with their feelings about Vietnam,
Vietnam itself continues its struggle to rebuild following a century of colonialism,
twenty years of war, and another twenty years of international political and eco-
nomic isolation.2 In May of 1964, at the outset of the Vietnam conflict, Washington
imposed a complete trade embargo on Hanoi, North Vietnam.3 As a parting shot
following the defeat of U. S. -backed South Vietnam and the fall of Saigon4 in 1975,
the White House extended the embargo to cover all of Vietnam.5 Since that time,
the United States has maintained the embargo and has continued to use it as leverage
in order to pursue its own political agenda in its dealings with the Vietnamese Gov-
ernment. For example, the embargo has been used to put pressure on the Vietnam-
ese Government to cooperate in the effort to account for the more than two thousand
U.S. military personnel still unaccounted for, even though U.S. officials are aware
that a large number of these people are dead.6
Moreover, in recent years politicians in Washington have with increasing fre-
quency questioned the embargo's purpose, effectiveness, and even its moral
justifications.7 Indeed, the question is at least valid as to whether the embargo
was simply a means by which to punish the Vietnamese for a war that ended
limited war and the communists weren't. The second is the moment you learn your
country is not 100 percent behind you, get the hell out-no matter what the losses
might be. The third is censorship. I am convinced that without censorship-and with
unlimited television-we would have lost World War II. There is nothing that looks
like blood on color television. You can't have scenes of American bodies, thrown
into trucks like so much cordwood, served up with dinner night after night after night
and expect the American people to support the situation.
Id.
2. Terry McDermott, Vietnam Rising, Despite U.S. Embargo, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 12, 1993,
at Al.
3. Kathleen Callo, Vietnam Hopes 1993 Will Bring End to U.S. Embargo, REUTER Bus. REP.,
Jan. 24, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File.
4. Saigon was renamed Ho Chi Minh City following the collapse of South Vietnam in 1975.
5. Callo, supra note 3, para. 9.
6. U.S. Commander Says Embargo's End Will Help MIA Search, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
Feb. 4, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. As of August 25, 1994, 2,229 U.S.
servicemen were listed as missing in Indochina, including 1,639 in Vietnam. 505 and 77 U.S.
servicemen were listed as missing in Laos and Cambodia respectively, the majority of these men
having been lost in areas occupied by Vietnamese forces at that time. Eight U.S. servicemen were
listed as missing in the territory of the People's Republic of China. Telephone interview with Major
David Moore, Office of the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, POW/MIA
office, External Affairs Directorate, in the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. (Aug. 25, 1994).
7. As an example, on January 27, 1994, the U.S. Senate approved a nonbinding resolution in
favor of lifting the embargo against Vietnam. Sue Kendall, Senate Votes to Lift US Embargo Against
Vietnam, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Jan. 27, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
"The move, adopted by a vote of 62-38, was sponsored by former Vietnam veterans from both sides
of the political spectrum-Senator John Kerry, a Democrat of Massachusetts, and Senator John
McCain, a Republican of Arizona who spent six years in Vietnam as a prisoner of war." Id. In
fact, "[s]ix of the Senate's eight Vietnam veterans voted in favor of lifting the embargo . . . arguing
that Vietnam is more likely to cooperate with the U.S. search for the missing if Americans are doing
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nearly twenty years ago, or worse yet, a vain and futile attempt by the United
States Government somehow to "reverse the outcome of the war, [and] to reorder
the relationship between winner and loser." 8 In light of the vast economic potential
that Vietnam promises, the recent Vietnamese governmental reforms, its new
commitment toward establishing a market economy,9 its recent efforts to cooper-
ate with U.S. demands on the POW/MIA issue,'° and the mere passage of nearly
twenty years, the arguments for maintaining an economic trade embargo against
Vietnam have eroded considerably.
As a result, despite considerable opposition from some of the twenty-seven million
U.S. veterans," various veterans' groups, 2 and politicians 13 concerned that without
the embargo Vietnam would have no incentive to account for the more than two
thousand U.S. servicemen listed as missing in action from the war, 14 President Bill
Clinton announced on February 3, 1994, that the U.S. trade embargo against Vietnam
would be lifted.' 5 The announcement came in the face of mounting pressure from
the U.S. business community, which feared that its companies were missing out on the
excellent opportunities accompanying Vietnam's economic rebirth and development.
business there in a friendly environment rather than if Hanoi remains isolated." Thomas Lippman,
MIA Activists Fight on for Vietnam Embargo, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 3, 1994, at A23. This vote
of support was key in President Clinton's decision to lift the embargo.
8. McDermott, supra note 2.
9. In addition to governmental reforms, Vietnam is undergoing drastic economic renovation,
or doi moi. Both of these developments are discussed in greater detail in a later section of this
Comment.
10. POW stands for "prisoner of war" and MIA stands for "missing in action." This issue
has been the single biggest obstacle to normalized relations between the United States and Vietnam.
On January 17, 1994, Admiral Charles Larson, Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Pacific Command,
provided one of the key elements for Clinton's decision to lift the embargo when he reported from
Vietnam that he had "seen cooperation increase significantly over the last two years" which has
produced 5,600 "meaningful notifications" to families of MIAs. US Admiral Says Presence in
Vietnam Shows Progress on M1As, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Jan. 17, 1994, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws File. He also stated that "[Ilifting the embargo is a political decision. If that
political decision is made then it could have a positive impact on my efforts." Id. Admiral Larson's
visit to Vietnam was one of several such trips by U.S. politicians, military personnel, and business
leaders "aimed at creating conditions under which President Bill Clinton could abolish the 19-year-old
economic embargo." Id.
11. Patrick Cockburn, Clinton Set to Lift Trade Embargo on Vietnamese, INDEPENDENT, Feb.
3, 1994, at 15.
12. Kendall, supra note 7.
13. Id. Senator Bob Smith, a New Hampshire Republican, offered a "proposal that would have
prevented the president from lifting the embargo until Vietnam had made the fullest possible account-
ing" of U.S. servicemen still listed as missing in action (MIA) from the war. Id. Smith, a Vietnam
veteran himself, disapproved of the Senate vote as "immoral and incomprehensible." Id. Referring to
Clinton's decision to lift the embargo, Smith stated that "Vietnam has just won the final battle of the
war. The US has led Vietnam to victory by giving them what they have wanted all along." Id.
14. Business Leaders Welcome Lifting of US Embargo Against Vietnam, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
Feb. 4, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File [hereinafter Business Leaders].
15. Kelly McParland, Clinton Lifts Embargo on Trade with Hanoi, FIN. POST, Feb. 4, 1994,
sec. 1, at 6. The decision to lift the embargo came just days after the Senate's vote in support of
such a move by the President. See Kendall, supra note 7.
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President Clinton's decision, especially difficult for a Democratic president who did
not serve in the war and faced accusations of draft-dodging during his election
campaign, 16 was made considerably easier by a convincing vote by the U.S. Senate
in favor of lifting the embargo just one week earlier. 7
This Comment is designed to be read on more than one level. First and foremost,
its purpose is to assist the reader in understanding the recent decision to lift the
U.S. embargo against Vietnam. In addition, the Comment attempts to provide a
meaningful and informative look at some of the events that have shaped Vietnam's
history, the circumstances surrounding Vietnam's position today, and the role
that the United States will play in Vietnam's future.
I. Prewar Vietnam
The story of Vietnam's struggle dates back to the mid-1800s when France
sought to expand its colonial interests in the Southeast Asian region that became
known as French Indochina.'8 By 1893 France had completed its empire in South-
east Asia by declaring Cambodia, Laos, and what is now Vietnam as French
protectorates.' 9 During the early 1900s, however, in the period leading up to
World War II, nationalist emotion swelled among the people of Vietnam, and
in 1930 nationalism in Vietnam gained further momentum and direction when
Ho Chi Minh organized the Indochina Communist Party.2 °
In 1940, when Hitler's German army defeated France, the French position in
Southeast Asia was altered dramatically. French administrators still in Indochina
were left without support and as a result were unable to maintain military control
of the region. 2' Although the French were no longer in power in Vietnam, the
country's sovereignty was not at all secure. As French influence and control
were disappearing, the Japanese were attempting to re-establish their interests
in the south Pacific, including the territories of Indochina as part of the once
great Japanese Empire.22 Faced with the threat of expansionist Japan, Ho Chi
Minh formed the "Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi, '- 23 or Viet Minh, which
became the leading resistance group against Japanese occupation.24
16. Kendall, supra note 7.
17. Business Leaders, supra note 14. The fact that the vote was spearheaded by a pair of bipartisan
senators, each of whom had served in the Vietnam War, added support for the decision to lift the
embargo. Id.; see also Kendall, supra note 7.





23. KENNETH ANDERSON, U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS 1945-1985, at 108 (1984). The name
Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi means League for the Independence of Vietnam and became
known by its abbreviated name, the Viet Minh. Id.
24. Id. Ironically, the United States, which had played a limited role in Indochina up to this
point, was supplying Ho Chi Minh and his revolutionary army with American arms for the stated
purpose of rescuing downed Allied pilots and defending Vietnam against Japanese occupation. Id.
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Following the Japanese surrender and the end of World War II in August 1945,
the Communists declared the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the capital city
of Hanoi on September 2, 1945.25 Despite this action, the allies had already
decided that Indochina should be reoccupied, and the French again entered Ha-
noi.26 As before, the French were numerically weak, and in 1950 the Viet Minh
resumed its guerrilla-style raids on French outposts. The Communist raids and
ambushes against the French continued to increase in intensity and the French
were once again forced to retreat. The Viet Minh repeatedly ambushed the French
forces as they withdrew out of northern Vietnam, and on May 7, 1954, the French
were forced into an embarrassing surrender to the Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu.27
The French then negotiated for and signed the Geneva Agreements, providing
for the withdrawal of all French forces from Vietnam.28
The Geneva Agreements also divided Vietnam along the 17th parallel; Ho Chi
Minh returned to Hanoi as the leader of the new Democratic Republic of North
Vietnam, 29 and the western-oriented Republic of South Vietnam was established
in its capital of Saigon under its anti-French and anti-Communist president, Ngo
Dinh Diem. 30 This arbitrary geographical division, however, would achieve only
temporary peace as tensions remained high between North and South Vietnam."
The Communists in North Vietnam fully expected the new government of South
Vietnam to collapse, which would then enable Ho Chi Minh to reunite Vietnam
under his Communist rule.32
In the meantime, South Vietnam, having modeled itself after the United States,33
and with the support of U.S. military advisors and economic aid, 4 began to flourish
as a capitalist economy. The entrepreneurial spirit thrived in Saigon, then often
25. BECKETT, supra note 18, at 62.
26. Id. British forces in the south and Nationalist Chinese forces in the north met along the 16th
Parallel and were later joined by French forces. Id. Allied troops had also entered Laos and Cambodia.
Id. The fighting isolated the Communist forces and forced the Viet Minh to withdraw to the northern
mountain regions and the swamps of the Red River delta. Id. The British withdrew their forces in
early 1946 leaving the French in control of Vietnam once again. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. The agreement was signed in Geneva on July 21, 1954. Laos and Cambodia also received
their independence from French rule under the 1954 Geneva Agreements. Id. at 80. These events also
marked the end of nine years of war in Indochina in which nearly 75,000 French troops (including the
Vietnamese National Army) and an estimated 150,000 Viet Minh were killed. Id. Once again, "a major
European army had been worn down and defeated by an unconventional peasant force." Id.
29. Id. at 63.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 181. Following the cease-fire that resulted from the Geneva Agreements and the division
of Vietnam at the 17th Parallel, an estimated 800,000 refugees fled North Vietnam into South Vietnam,
as opposed to the estimated 80,000 South Vietnamese who fled to the north. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 192. The Government of the Republic of South Vietnam was based on a constitution
similar to that of the United States, with an elected president, senate, and assembly. Id.
34. Id. at 181.
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referred to as the "Pearl of the Orient." 35 South Vietnam possessed all of the
elements necessary to build a successful economy: a well-educated and highly literate
population, a strong work ethic, strong family values, and a cohesive population.1
6
South Vietnam was also home to the rice fields of the Mekong River delta, which
some experts claimed could have produced up to five million tons of rice per year.
37
II. The Vietnam War
The economic and political success of South Vietnam surprised the Communist
Government of the North. As a result, North Vietnam once again began to wage
guerrilla warfare against the South using the members of the Viet Minh, now called
the Viet Cong. 3' By this time, the North Vietnamese Communists were receiving
abundant economic and military aid from the Soviet Union and China, and it soon
became clear that Vietnam was to become the next pawn in the geopolitical chess
match between the United States and the Soviet Union. In an attempt to maintain
the democratic integrity of South Vietnam, direct U.S. military aid began in 1961.
By 1963, however, the combined efforts of the U.S. military and the South
Vietnamese Government had proved ineffective, and the people of South Vietnam
had become impatient. On May 5, 1964, the United States imposed a complete
trade embargo on Communist North Vietnam. 40 Nevertheless, the economic pres-
35. Joseph Kahn, Seeking an End to Trade Hostilities; Vietnam Gears Up for Lifting of U.S.
Embargo, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 8, 1993, at DI. Indeed some "[residents of Ho Chi Minh
City, which most Vietnamese refer to without hesitation by its traditional name of Saigon, remember
a time that the 'Pearl of the Orient' made now-booming Asian capitals like Bangkok and Jakarta
seem like provincial backwaters." Id.
36. Id.
37. BECKETT, supra note 18, at 192. This figure is an estimate assuming the introduction of the
"miracle" rice strains and peace in Vietnam. Id. Unfortunately, peace did not last, and as a result,
for many years South Vietnam had to import cereals instead of exporting its own rice. Id.
38. Id. at 182. The Viet Cong, which stands for Vietnamese Communists, had a system of
underground movement known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which ran through the jungles of Laos
and into Cambodia allowing the Viet Cong to avoid detection by the South Vietnamese Army and
infiltrate South Vietnam from any point along its 600-mile western border. Id. The system was
virtually invisible among the general population and had military support from both village squads
and regional and regular units. Id. Without the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the Communist-supported Viet
Cong could not have carried on a war in the south. Id.
39. Id. The use of the Ho Chi Minh Trail and North Vietnam's unauthorized presence in Laos
eventually prompted President Kennedy to send a Marine brigade to northeast Thailand in 1961. Id.
The Americans had already established air bases there for the defense of Thailand. Laos was later
neutralized by the Geneva Conference, which in turn proved only to further shield the use of the
Ho Chi Minh Trail by the Viet Cong. Id.
40. Marian Leich & Lori Vassar, Foreign Assets Control, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 539, § I (1990). The
Foreign Assets Control Regulations (FACR) were issued for the first time in December 1950 following
China's entry into the Korean War. Id. The regulations imposed a complete embargo on trade or financial
transactions of any kind involving China or North Korea, or any nationals of those countries. Id. This
embargo also had the effect of freezing all government and privately owned Chinese and North Korean
assets that were subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. Id. North Vietnam was added to the list
of countries to which the FACR apply on May 5, 1964; Cambodia and South Vietnam were added to
the list on April 17, 1975, and April 30, 1975, respectively, after the fall of their capital cities of Phnom
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sure and threat of U.S. military involvement had little effect on North Vietnam
as their war against South Vietnam continued. Later that year, South Vietnam's
President Diem was deposed and killed in a violent coup, 4' and was succeeded
by a series of ineffectual leaders. 2 Similarly, the United States suffered the loss
of its leader when President Kennedy, who was reportedly aware of the plot to
depose Diem,43 was assassinated just three weeks later on November 22, 1963."
President Lyndon B. Johnson succeeded Kennedy and immediately faced the
increasing problems in Vietnam. 5
On the second and fourth of August 1964 North Vietnamese torpedo boat
patrols initiated two separate attacks on U.S. warships in the Gulf of Tonkin off
the coast of North Vietnam. 6 These incidents were regarded by the White House
as unprovoked attacks on the U.S. Navy in international waters and were the
sparks that ignited the Vietnam War.
Ironically, Johnson, as a United States Senate floor leader in 1954, had led the
Democratic party's opposition to U.S. intervention in the French Indochina War
during the last battle at Dien Bien Phu. 48 However, after his re-election in 1964,
Penh and Saigon to Communist forces. Id. Trade restrictions with China were later lifted on June 10,
1971, and all Chinese assets were unblocked on January 13, 1980. Id.
In May 1975 a survey of all blocked South Vietnamese accounts of at least $50,000 at major U.S.
banks in the Federal Reserve Districts of New York, San Francisco, and Kansas City revealed that
approximately $79 million in South Vietnamese assets were being blocked. Id. These blocked South
Vietnamese assets, as of early 1988, totaled over $218 million, which does not include the value
of the Vietnamese embassy building in Washington, D.C. Id.
41. BECKETT, supra note 18, at 182.
42. ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 115. The coup that led to the murder of President Diem was
led by General Duong Van Minh, who was ousted himself in a subsequent coup led by General
Nguyen Khanh, who in turn was later succeeded by Air Vice-Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky. Id. In the
twenty months following the first coup, South Vietnam had ten successive heads of state. Id.
43. BECKETT, supra note 18, at 192. "Kennedy ensured the overthrow of Diem by letting South
Vietnamese military leaders know that, if there was a change of government, American aid would
still be forthcoming." Id.
44. ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 115.
45. Id. "The war, begun during the Eisenhower administration, failed to show any signs of
success for South Vietnam or the United States, despite the buildup of U.S. military advisors from
685 in 1960 to 16,000 during the Kennedy administration." Id. at 115-16. "A steady flow of White
House advisers, consultants and observers between Washington and Saigon also had failed to provide
a viable plan for resolving the conflict without surrendering South Vietnam and its 17 million people
to the Communist world." Id. Almost overnight, Johnson, who had been kept in the dark regarding
most of Kennedy's covert war against the Communists in Vietnam, was suddenly faced with the
possibility of sending U.S. troops into battle. Id.
46. Id. at 116.
47. Id.
On 5 August 1964, President Johnson appeared on national television to announce
that "hostile actions on the high seas" had required him to order the military forces
of the United States to "take action in reply." As Johnson spoke, more than 60
carrier-based planes from the Constellation and Ticonderoga bombed the port and oil
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President Johnson made the difficult decision to fully commit the United States to
the war in Vietnam.49 By the end of 1964 U.S. armed forces in South Vietnam
totaled 23,000. 0 The first few years of the war seemed to go well, and as 1967
drew to a close, the Americans had won every battle. 5' At that point, the number
of U.S. forces in Vietnam was nearing its peak of 540,000,52 and President Johnson
was pressing for a complete military victory before the next election in 1968.53
At the same time, the costs of carrying on the war in Vietnam were also rising
rapidly, both in terms of loss of life and in dollars spent. The number of casualties
increased by hundreds each week, and the costs had reached as much as $30 billion
per year. 4 The emotional and political costs of carrying on an increasingly unpopular
war were rising as well. As a result, "[a]n army undefeated in the field was losing
the war. -55 Because the military and economic support for North Vietnam was
provided by the Communist governments of the Soviet Union and China, its entire
outlook on the war was different from that of the United States. Even though the
North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong had lost many more lives,56 their "win at
all costs" attitude had begun to make a difference in the outcome of the war.
This point is important, as the ideological differences of the two countries played
a key role in determining the outcome of the Vietnam War. On the one hand,
Americans did then and continue to hold the United States Government directly
responsible for the well-being of its citizens, including the troops fighting its battles.
On the other hand, in an authoritarian state such as Communist North Vietnam,
government and military leaders are not bound by the same social concerns and are
therefore not held accountable for the tremendous loss of life incurred by their
people. 57 In addition, the Vietnamese were fighting to defend their own land, families,
and political beliefs, whereas the American soldiers were fighting on foreign soil,
49. BECKETT, supra note 18, at 183. Although the decision to plunge America into a war is a
difficult one, the alternative to committing to the war was equally unattractive. Id. at 183. If Johnson
were to have avoided the war, it would have involved the difficult and unpleasant task of withdrawing
20,000 men; more importantly, it would have shown weakness in the resolve of the United States
in its policy against Communist expansion. Id.
50. Id. at 182. During 1964 insurgent activity by the Viet Cong had increased dramatically as
it continued to attack and defeat South Vietnamese units. Id.
51. Id. at 183.
52. Id. However, out of the 540,000 U.S. troops in Vietnam, fewer than 100,000 were operational
at any given time. Id.
53. Id. "The Democrats, already blamed for the loss of China 16 years before, could not face
the prospect of another failure"; therefore it was supremely important for Johnson, and the Democratic
Party as a whole, to secure a victory in Vietnam. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 184.
56. Id. at 183. "While the NVA's and the Viet Cong's casualties were much higher, they did
not approach even half the annual birth rate [of Vietnam]." Id.
57. Id. In the United States, a military campaign that results in heavy casualties is often a political
liability, whereas in a totalitarian state such as North Vietnam, the general population does not have
access to the kind of information that might produce discontent in the decisions of the government.
Furthermore, any such discontent that is fostered is immediately quashed either by the oppressive
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determined to stop the spread of Communist oppression. Not only did American
soldiers find it difficult to identify the enemy in a nation divided by civil war, they
also received little support from the American public at home, which questioned the
necessity of losing American lives in the jungles of a third-world country half-a-world
away. Conversely, no "political liability" a was incurred by the Communists in
fighting a war in which its troops were dying at a rate of more than two-to-one. 59
The use of guerrilla warfare and surprise attacks such as the Tet Offensive in 1968,
although costly to the Viet Cong, had a demoralizing effect on U.S. troops in Vietnam
and increased the public dissent at home.6° Faced with the 1968 election, President
Johnson was forced to agree to halt all bombing of North Vietnam in order to begin
talks of peace with Hanoi.
When President Nixon took office in 1969, however, the moratorium on bomb-
ing North Vietnam had the effect of limiting Nixon's leverage in his dealings
with Hanoi. 6' As a result, "[t]he whole emphasis was necessarily switched from
an American war aiming at military victory to a longer-haul, lower-cost strategy
which would gradually turn the war over to the Vietnamese."- 62 Initially, this
new strategy proved effective until Moscow began a massive build-up of supplies
and Soviet weaponry in support of the North's impending invasion of the South,
which began on March 30, 1972.63 In response, the United States resumed its
bombing of North Vietnam and the invasion stalled, triggering further negotia-
tions between Washington and Hanoi. By this time, Nixon was under considerable
pressure from the American public to "settle at any price."
64
The U.S. involvement in Vietnam, which began during the Truman adminis-
tration and lasted more than twenty years, officially ended on March 29, 1973,
as the last U.S. troops withdrew from Vietnam. 65 Following the signing of
the Paris Agreements, Hanoi began releasing some of the American POWs
nature of a totalitarian government or the lack of any viable means of voicing an individual opinion.
In addition, the Vietnamese culture is based upon sacrifice, even to the point of death, and such
willing sacrifice was shared by young and old alike during the Vietnam conflict.
58. Id. at 182.
59. Id. at 183.
60. Id. at 184; see also ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 142.
Reports of desertion, AWOL, defiance of military orders and attacks on officers by
enlisted men ("fraggin"), suddenly soared to the highest rate in history. A later report
in 1972 showed that fully 25 percent of US Army troops had violated one or more
of the military regulations. Soldiers with drug-abuse problems outnumbered the com-
bat-injured in military hospitals.
Id. At home, an estimated 250,000 young men refused to register for the draft, and more than 50,000
fled the country to avoid military service. Id. at 140.
61. Id. at 140.
62. Id. The purpose of this strategy was to enable the Vietnamese to hold their own country
with limited involvement from the United States.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 146.
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it was holding.66 While the agreement brought peace between the United States
and North Vietnam, it did not bring peace between North and South Vietnam.
As American aid to South Vietnam diminished, the North prepared to launch
another invasion, 67 and by early 1975 South Vietnam was virtually defenseless
against the revitalized Communist North. As the North Vietnamese forces
closed in on Saigon, the United States initiated the largest aerial evacuation
in history, including all American personnel and as many South Vietnamese
as possible.68
Saigon fell to the Communist forces of North Vietnam on April 30, 1975. On
that same day, the United States Government added South Vietnam to the full
trade embargo already imposed on North Vietnam.6 9 The cost of the war in
terms of lives was enormous. The final numbers totaled 56,379 Americans dead,
925,962 North Vietnamese killed, as well as losses of 189,314 South Vietnamese
and other "Free World" troops.70 Although the Vietnam War was over, the
American people would continue to feel the devastating effects of America's
longest and most controversial conflict for years to come.7' Communism had
66. Id. The U.S. military also began operations in Vietnam to search for and identify the approxi-
mately 2,500 men listed as missing in action or killed in action at that time. Id.
67. Id.
No clause in the Paris Agreement called for the withdrawal of Communist troops.
South Vietnam, with a potential army of one million troops, was considered capable
of defending itself. Thus, the North Vietnamese plan for its "liberation" of South
Vietnam started up again ... [and] quickly evolved into division-size military attacks
against strategic positions in the South.
Id. The North Vietnamese also invaded and conquered Cambodia, capturing its capital of Phnom
Penh on April 17, 1975. Id.
68. Id. at 147. The evacuation included many pro-U.S. South Vietnamese officials and their
families who were in danger of being executed if captured by the Communists. Id. 7,014 persons
were evacuated; and on April 30, 1975, when Saigon fell into the hands of Communist control, the
last flight carrying the U.S. Marines and the American flag from the U.S. embassy departed from
South Vietnam. Id.
69. Leich, supra note 40.
70. ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 146; see also Laura Palmer, The Nurses of Vietnam, Still
Wounded: Only Now They Are Healing Themselves, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1993, Magazine, at 38.
With respect to limiting the number American casualties,
[hielicopters made the difference. Soldiers who would have died on battlefields in
World War II and Korea were evacuated to hospitals, sometimes within minutes of
being wounded. While the percentage of soldiers that survived in Vietnam was higher
than in any other war, the injuries they suffered were far more traumatic because it
was a guerrilla war. There were more amputations in Vietnam than in World War II and
Korea combined. Three hundred thousand troops were injured, half of them severely. In
Vietnam, a gunshot wound to the chest was a routine wound. Land mines, grenades,
rockets and mortars mauled, maimed and mutilated the youngest soldiers America
ever sent into combat.
Id.
71. Hearts and Minds, supra note 1. George Ball, a former Under Secretary of State, opposed
the increased U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Id.
Among other things in Vietnam, it seems tome we sacrificed a number of our principles,
and we've been paying for it in a general degradation of the American spirit ever
since. I have often wondered sometimes if it was not inevitable. After the second
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seized yet another country, and the Soviet Union's ominous presence in the world
loomed large. These events would eventually force the United States to re-evaluate
its geopolitical role and foreign policy following its first military defeat.72
III. Postwar Vietnam
Although Vietnam was united under Communist rule in 1975, the father of the
Vietnamese Communist movement, Ho Chi Minh, who led the original anti-French
uprising, did not live to see his dream of a unified Communist Vietnam; he died
in 1969. Nonetheless, the Communists of the North soon crushed the capitalist
hopes of the South Vietnamese when the state took over the entire economy and
put socialist economic institutions into place. As the managing director of a joint-
venture investment company, Nguyen Trung Truc, recalls the period following the
Communist takeover, "[a]fter the revolution, those who fought were rewarded
with fully subsidized state jobs, and the southerners who had prospered before 1975
were made to pay." 73 To those Vietnamese suffering through the hardships of a
poor economy, a subsidized job was truly the utopian promise of socialism come
true. But to those Vietnamese who had tasted the opportunity of capitalism and a
free market economy, that promise was all but empty.
A. THE U.S. EMBARGO
The United States often uses its economic strength to further its geopolitical
and economic agenda as an alternative to armed conflict. Because the economy
of the United States is so prevalent in the scheme of international trade, its
influence is substantial. As a result, an embargo imposed by the United States,
which is often adhered to by many other industrialized nations for fear of upsetting
their own trade relations with the United States, can place considerable pressure
on the embargoed nation's government to cooperate. The embargo against Viet-
world war, the United States found itself the undisputed leader of the whole non-
communist world, and we had a feeling we could do everything . . . sooner or later
I suppose we had to come up against the hard reality . . . [and] in Vietnam we learned
that lesson in just the worst possible way-the dragged-on commitment, the loss of
confidence in our leaders, the disruptive effect on a whole generation.
Id.
72. The tragedy of Vietnam may be somewhat mitigated by the valuable lessons learned by U.S.
government and military leaders. As the United States continues to develop its increasing role in
foreign affairs as a "global policeman," perhaps the two most important lessons are these. First,
it is important to have the support of the American public before committing U.S. soldiers to armed
conflict, although situations may arise when securing this support may be impossible or for security
reasons impracticable. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, once the commitment of U.S. mili-
tary forces is made, the goal should be, to the extent possible, a rapid and complete victory. The
United States has employed these strategies with measured success in numerous armed conflicts since
Vietnam, most recently in the Persian Gulf War of 1991.
73. Raymond Whitaker, Vietnam Woos Old Saigon Capitalism, INDEPENDENT, Sept. 26, 1993,
at 16, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allows File.
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nam was just one example of how the United States sought to achieve its foreign
policy and national security goals by flexing its economic muscles.
Following its imposition, the U.S. embargo against Vietnam was maintained and
controlled by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (FAC) of the U.S. Treasury
Department. 74 That office acts under the authority of the President's statutory emer-
gency and wartime powers, which allow it to impose controls on transactions with
foreign countries. 7' The specific sources of this power are found in the Trading
With the Enemy Act76 (TWEA), which was originally intended to apply during
wartime only,77 but was extended to nonwartime situations through the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act78 (IEEPA). 79 These acts give the President the
power to "prohibit or regulate commercial or financial transactions involving selected
foreign countries designated in FAC regulations.'" ' In addition, the President also
has the executive authority to lift an embargo without congressional approval."'
The United States may employ these broad economic powers as leverage against
another country in primarily two ways. First, the Office of Foreign Assets Control
can "freeze" the assets of a particular country by prohibiting any transactions
involving the embargoed nation's assets that are subject to U.S. jurisdiction.8 2
Under this type of restriction, the frozen assets-usually in the form of bank
deposits-cannot be transferred in any manner without a treasury license.8 3 These
assets are thereby unavailable to the foreign country, enabling the United States
to use them as leverage in its dealings with foreign governments and industries.
For example, such frozen assets "may be used as a bargaining chip in negotiating
claims settlements with designated nations or, as a last resort, can be vested and
distributed to U.S. nationals with claims against those countries. " ' 4 Since the
embargo has been lifted, negotiations are underway between the United States
and Vietnam to discuss existing claims on their respective frozen assets.
74. R. Richard Newcomb, Economic Sanctions and Embargo-Foreign Assets Control Programs,
C399 A.L.I. 211, 213 (1989).
75. Id. As of November 1989 the FAC office was freezing assets and imposing comprehensive
economic embargoes against North Korea, Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Libya; trade sanctions
against Iran and Nicaragua; economic sanctions against Panama; and trade and economic sanctions
against South Africa. Id. The FAC also administers certain restrictions on exports of strategic materials
to several Communist nations. Id.
76. Trading With the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. § 5 (1917).
77. Michael Scown, As the Embargo Crumbles, Vietnam Prepares for U.S. Investors, 4 J. INT'L
TAX'N 12 (1993).
78. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1977).
79. Scown, supra note 77.
80. Newcomb, supra note 74, at 213.
81. Carol Giacomo, Clinton Move Frees Businessmen in Vietnam, REUTERS LTD., Feb. 3, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
82. Newcomb, supra note 74.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. End of U.S. Embargo "'Opens New Page "--ietnam, REUTER ASIA-PAC. Bus. REP., Feb.
4, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. These assets are primarily in the form
of South Vietnamese bank accounts in the United States, and U.S. property left in Saigon, totaling
about $500 million for each country. Id.
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The second manner in which the economic powers under the TWEA and IEEPA
may be used is through the imposition of comprehensive economic embargoes
prohibiting the financial transactions-such as bank lending unrelated to trade-
of designated nations. 8 6 This type of action can be either selective or comprehen-
sive in scope. A selective embargo prohibits a specific class of economic transac-
tions, whereas a comprehensive embargo, such as the one that was imposed
against Vietnam, prohibits all unlicensed economic transactions involving the
designated nation or any of its nationals.87
Accordingly, the embargo against Vietnam came into being through the FAC
regulations" and was issued under the authority of the TWEA. Since its introduc-
tion, U.S. Presidents maintained the embargo under the authority of the IEEPA. 89
This statutory authority created comprehensive economic sanctions and an em-
bargo program that blocked all assets of Vietnam, and its nationals subject to
U.S. jurisdiction, and prohibited U.S. persons (including foreign subsidiaries of
U.S. companies) from engaging in virtually all business dealings and commercial
transactions involving Vietnam. 9° The embargo encompassed import, export,
travel, and financial dealings between any U.S. individual or organization and
Vietnam or any of its nationals. 9' Moreover, the TWEA and the IEEPA also
imposed penalties for any violation of its terms.92
In addition to the embargo, the United States also encouraged a much wider
halt on international aid money to Vietnam after Vietnamese forces invaded
86. Newcomb, supra note 74, at 213.
87. Id. at 213-14. "Additional statutory authority is provided by the International Security and
Development Cooperation Act . . . [which] can be used to prohibit the importation of goods and
services from countries supporting terrorism." Id.
88. Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 500 (1993).
89. Newcomb, supra note 74, at 220.
90. Id.
91. Id. The specific program elements-as of November 1989-were as follows:
Imports: No goods, services or technology (except informational materials) may be
imported directly or transshipped through any third country. Exports: No goods,
services or technology (except informational materials) may be imported directly or
transshipped through any third country. Travel: Permitted by individuals only; no
tours may be organized or sold by U.S. travel agencies. Financial: No transfers of
credit or financial transactions are permitted, except for family remittances not to
exceed $300 per quarter per household. Assets blocked: All assets subject to U.S.
jurisdiction are blocked. Specially Designated Nationals: The Regulations prohibit
buying from or selling to Vietnamese, Cambodian or North Korean nationals whether
they are physically located in the country or doing business elsewhere on behalf of
their respective governments. Individuals or organizations who act on behalf of these
countries anywhere in the world are considered by the U.S. Treasury Department to
be "Specially Designated Nationals" of these countries. Their names are published
in the Federal Register. The listing, however, is a partial one and any U.S. individual
or organization engaging in transactions with foreign nationals must take reasonable
care to make certain that such foreign nationals are not specially designated.
Id.
92. Id. at 221. Corporate criminal penalties up to $500,000 and individual criminal penalties
up to $250,000 and twelve years in jail may be imposed for each violation of the embargo. Id. "In
addition, civil penalties of up to $10,000 may be imposed administratively." Id.
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Cambodia in 1979. 9' Although the Vietnamese economy would most likely have
been able to survive without direct trade and investment from U.S. corporations,
the U.S. embargo also served as an obstacle to direct investment from third-party
nations such as Japan. 94 Specifically, the U.S. embargo had effectively blocked
lending to Vietnam by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
and the Asian Development Bank. 95 Indeed, in 1991 a French proposal that at-
tempted to pay off Vietnam's IMF arrears96 was defeated due to pressure from
the United States. 97 This interference by the United States was at least in part
aimed at preventing other nations from providing multilateral aid to a country
where U.S. businessmen could not compete-due to the embargo-for the con-
tracts that would necessarily flow from such an infusion of money. 98
B. VIETNAM'S GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMY SINCE THE WAR
Due to the U.S. embargo, South Vietnam and its people were cut off from
what had been an important source of economic aid and investment. Not only
was Vietnam isolated from the U.S. economy, but other non-Communist industri-
alized nations were reluctant to deal with Vietnam for fear of jeopardizing their
93. Teresa Poole, Why Vietnam Needs America; They Want to Join the World, but the United
States Won't Let Them, INDEPENDENT, Dec. 30, 1991, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allows
File.
94. Fumio Sumiya, Lifting of U.S. Embargo Spurs Japan Traders, NIKKEI WKLY., Feb. 7, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. For many years, Japan demonstrated considerable
deference to the U.S. embargo against Vietnam. Id. For example, Japanese companies set up only
eleven joint ventures in Vietnam from 1989 to 1992 as compared with the more than 300 set up in
China during that same period. id.
95. Decision on Vietnam Relations Is Due Soon, Christopher Says, INT'L TRADE REP., June 23,
1993, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, Intrad File. The IMF is a multilateral agency that makes
low interest loans, which are subsidized by the governments that fund the agency. Id. Although it
has no veto power, the United States is the largest shareholder in the IMF, and as such, can block
lending to Vietnam by persuading other major shareholders such as France, the United Kingdom,
and Japan to support its position. Id.
96. U.S. Businesses Increase Contacts with Vietnam, as IMF Action May Weaken Embargo,
INT'L TRADE REP., Mar. 31, 1993, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, Intrad File [hereinafter U.S.
Businesses Increase].
Technically, the only obstacle to Vietnam's getting new credit from both the IMF
and World Bank is the $140 million it owes the Fund. In the past two years a coalition
of IMF member nations, led by France, has been attempting to package a bridg[ing]
loan to enable the Vietnamese to repay the debt. But politically, the obstacle has been
the U.S. embargo.
Id.
97. Poole, supra note 93. This kind of interference has frustrated the attempts of the Vietnamese
to revitalize their economy through foreign investment. Id. The attitude of most Vietnamese toward
the United States embargo can be summed up as follows: the "Americans don't have to help us.
But they should let us help ourselves." Kahn, supra note 35.
98. Id. According to the 1991 World Bank figures, Vietnam received just $2.1 per capita in
official development assistance funds, compared with $34.8 per capita received by nearby Laos and
$12.6 per capita received by Thailand for such assistance programs. Id.
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own economic trade relations with the United States. 99 As a result, Vietnam relied
almost exclusively on the Soviet Union and its Communist satellite nations of
Eastern Europe for its trading partners. Even after the war, the Soviet Union
continued to provide Vietnam with an average of $3 billion in economic and
military aid each year,'0° including some materials essential for industry, such
as cotton, fuel, fertilizer, and steel.'0 ' In return, Vietnam granted the Soviet
Union the right to explore for offshore oil along its coastline.'02
More importantly, however, the Communist government in Hanoi chose to
structure its institutions based on the Soviet model of communism and central
planning. Consequently, much like the Soviet Union, Vietnam began experiencing
economic difficulty almost immediately. In fact, 1976 was the only year that
Communist Vietnam's economy was able to produce a surplus, failing to support
itself through most of the 1980s.' °3 Industries that at one time had prospered
were no longer able to operate profitably under centralized state planning, and
the highly agricultural society of Vietnam sank to an average per capita income
of under $200 (U.S. currency) per year, making it one of the poorest countries
in the world.'04 To compound these economic problems, Vietnam was burdened
with a foreign debt of over $13 billion as of 1990.105 Dr. Nguyen Xuan Oanh,
a former prime minister of South Vietnam described the Communist transforma-
tion as follows: "In 1976, one year after the liberation-actually, they called it
liberation but we don't call it that at all, we call it defeat-they joined the countries
into one system, one made up of Maoism and Stalinism. Step by step, the country
ground to a halt. '' 6 As a result, the need for economic reform became increas-
ingly apparent to the Vietnamese Government.
In response to its worsening economic situation, the Vietnamese Government
hesitantly introduced economic reforms as early as 1979, but those reforms were
not implemented until the Communist Party of Vietnam's congresses of 1986
99. For example, Japan and France are two of the most prominent investors in Vietnam today.
However, both countries were hesitant to begin economic relations with Vietnam for fear that the
United States would take offense at such action. See Andrew Sherry, US Embargo's End Will Bring
Investment but Not Miracles to Vietnam, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Feb. 4, 1994, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws File. Following the lifting of the U.S. embargo, "[slome Japanese multination-
als are actually relieved, since they feel they no longer have to worry about triggering a US consumer
backlash against their products if they publicize their presence in Vietnam." Id.
100. International Relationships, POL. RISK SERVICES, Oct. 1, 1992, available in LEXIS, Asiapc
Library, RPTIBC File.
101. Vietnam, IBC Int'l Country Risk Guide, Oct. 1991, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library,
IBCCRG File [hereinafter Vietnam Risk Guide].
102. Id.
103. Michael Hirsh, Asia: East Asia's Not- Yet-Emerging Markets, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, May
27, 1993. In 1992 Vietnam produced a trade surplus of $80 million; it was that country's first such
surplus since 1976. Id.
104. Vietnam Risk Guide, supra note 101.
105. Investing in Vietnam; On Ho's Trail, ECONOMIST, May 19, 1990, at 79.
106. McDermott, supra note 2.
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and 1991.07 The turning point in the thinking of Vietnam's leadership occurred
during the abysmal collective harvest in 1982.108 Dr. Oanh, now a respected
"capitalist" thinker in Vietnam, recalled, "[t]his was the Russian system all
right. . . . We began to starve, like Russians. Can you imagine it? In this fertile
country? How could they claim socialism was working when people were eating
grain intended as animal feed and there wasn't enough foreign exchange to rectify
the situation through imports?"109 By the mid-1980s the Vietnamese Government,
although not willing to admit what the Vietnamese people already knew, began
to realize that their socialist economic model was failing.
Consequently, when the Soviet Union began experiencing economic problems
and curtailed its aid package to Vietnam,"° the Vietnamese Government became
even more frustrated. Another reason for Vietnam's increased dissatisfaction
with Moscow was the poor Soviet performance in the offshore oil exploration
agreement. "' In addition, Vietnamese leaders became suspicious of Soviet politi-
cal reforms and blamed Gorbachev for communism's collapse in Eastern Eu-
rope.'12 As a result, Vietnam's economic policies began to diverge from the
Soviet model. "' In 1986 Vietnam held its sixth Communist Party Congress,
during which the new economic policy of doi moi or renovation, was introduced." 
4
However, as Mr. Truc points out, "[h]istory will judge very harshly what hap-
pened here over the 15 years from 1975. . . . The leadership is not entitled to
that much credit for changing course, when the only alternative was starvation." "
5
By accepting the new economic policy of doi moi, the Vietnamese Government
agreed to allow market forces to operate in most sectors of the economy, albeit
under close socialist supervision and guidance." 6 With China as its new role model, "7
107. Dean Forbes, Hard-line Regimes, Changing Economies, Bus. TIMES, June 2, 1993, at 24.
108. Chris Pritchard, Vietnam: Welcoming a "Capitalist" Dawn, Bus. REv. WKLY., Nov. 8,
1991, at 22.
109. Id.
110. Vietnam Risk Guide, supra note 101. The political and economic turbulence in the Soviet
Union and the countries of Eastern Europe had a severe impact on the economic well-being of
Vietnam. Id. Finding itself in a financially precarious position, the Soviet Union, which had kept
Vietnam afloat during the early 1980s, dramatically cut its aid to Vietnam. Id. As of 1991 Moscow
had informed Hanoi that the $1.1 billion-a-year aid program (excluding military hardware and sup-
plies) would be drastically reduced. Id.
11. International Relationships, supra note 100.
112. Id.
113. Id. "The disappointing results of dependence on Soviet technology and the Gorbachev govern-
ment's admission that capitalism is a more efficient economic system than Communism ... renewed
Vietnamese interest in Western technology and capital investment." Id.
114. Pritchard, supra note 108.
115. Whitaker, supra note 73.
116. Pritchard, supra note 108.
117. Rod Nutt, Canada Set to Pounce as U.S. Embargo Lifted, VANCOUVER SUN, Feb. 5, 1994,
at H3, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. Speaking about Vietnam's investment laws,
Bill Neilson, director of the University of Victoria's Centre for Asia Pacific Initiatives, says that
"[o]n the face of it, the legal framework is the most liberal in Southeast Asia. China's commercial
law was a precursor of Vietnam's commercial law." Id.
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Vietnam chose to pursue gradual economic reform, while maintaining a firm hold
on political power." 8 This choice meant that while making a profit would now be
acceptable, political pluralism would not." 9 This unique shift from a command
economy to a market economy has been referred to by Dr. Oanh as "market social-
ism."°2 0 However, while these measures constituted major changes in the Vietnamese
economic philosophy, the intended economic development remained "suspended
due to the lack of money, capital goods, energy, managerial expertise and competent
bureaucrats." 2' To the bankrupt country of Vietnam, the most urgent of these needs
was capital, which would have to be obtained through foreign investment, a task
greatly hindered by the continued U.S. embargo.
C. THE 1987 FoREIGN INVESTMENT LAW
After discarding the Soviet methods of centralized economic controls, the
Vietnamese Communist Party realized that in order to develop the Vietnamese
society and expand its economy, it would need the support and investment of
other countries. In a bold attempt to attract foreign investment, the Vietnamese
Government drafted and passed one of the most liberal foreign investment codes
of any developing nation in the world, let alone Southeast Asia.'22 The Law
on Foreign Investment in Vietnam (1987 FIL),' 23 "[w]ith a view to expanding
economic cooperation with foreign countries, developing the national economy,
stepping up export on the basis of effective exploitation of natural resources,
118. Poole, supra note 93. " 'The formula in Vietnam is to carry out economic reform first,'
said one [Vietnamese official]. Political renovation, and then only within the one-party system, will
follow later. 'In Vietnam, the people recognize the Communist Party as the one and only ruling
party.' " Id.
119. Vietnam Risk Guide, supra note 101. Unfortunately, since the adoption of doi moi, economic
liberalization has far outpaced political reform. "This raises the prospect of a 'China situation',
where the failure of political reform to keep pace with economic reform culminates in social unrest
and the loss of years of potential progress." Id.
120. McDermott, supra note 2.
121. Vietnam Risk Guide, supra note 101.
122. Camellia Ngo, Foreign Investment Promotion: Thailand as a Model for Economic Develop-
ment in Vietnam, 16 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 67, 68 (1992).
123. Law on Foreign Investment in Vietnam of 1987, amended by Act of June 30, 1990, reprinted
in 30 I.L.M. 930 (1991) [hereinafter 1987 FIL]. The 1987 FIL is made up of six chapters containing
a total of forty-two articles. Chapter I (articles 1-3) contains the general policy statement toward
foreign investment, reserves Vietnam's sovereign interests, defines key terms used throughout the
code, and encourages investment in specified areas. Chapter II (articles 4-19) sets out the three forms
in which foreign investment may take place, as well as the requirements and conditions of establishing
and maintaining an enterprise in Vietnam. Chapter III (articles 20-25) contains important guarantees
of profit repatriation and freedom from nationalization. Chapter IV (articles 26-35) discusses the
rights and duties of foreign organizations and individuals residing in Vietnam, including tax incentives.
Chapter V (articles 36-38) describes the responsibilities and powers of the State Organ for Management
of Foreign Investment. Finally, Chapter VI (articles 39-42) contains various measures regarding the
implementation of the foreign investment law.
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labor and other potentialities,- 1 24 was issued by the Eighth Legislature of the
National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on December 29, 1987,
and was later amended on June 30, 1990.125
In addition to Chinese influence, the Vietnamese Government relied heavily
on nearby Thailand as a model for the development of its investment promotion
strategy. 12 6 The unique ability of Thailand to promote substantial foreign invest-
ment while maintaining its national independence is a characteristic greatly ad-
mired by the Vietnamese. However, an important difference exists in the Vietnam-
ese model of economic development. Unlike Thailand, which is ruled by a
constitutional monarchy, Vietnam remains a state controlled by the Communist
Party.'27 As a result, while the 1987 FIL is indeed a liberal promotion of foreign
investment by most standards, it retains provisions that require extensive govern-
mental approval before foreign investment activity may begin.' 2 8 The Vietnamese
Government uses this approval process as a means of political control by selec-
tively approving only those foreign-proposed projects that do not pose a serious
threat to the Communist Party. 2 9 The State Organ for Management of Foreign
124. Id. Furthermore, article 1 of the 1987 FIL begins as follows:
The State of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam welcomes and encourages foreign
organizations and private persons to invest capital and technology in Vietnam on the
basis of respect for the independence and sovereignty of Vietnam, observance of
Vietnamese laws, equality and mutual benefit. The State shall guarantee the ownership
of invested capital and other rights of foreign organizations and private persons and
extend to the latter favorable conditions and easy formalities for their investment in
Vietnam.
Id. art. 1.
125. Id. The 1987 FIL, which was the first major step in the Vietnamese campaign toward doi
moi or economic renovation, was actually a revision of the original Decree on Foreign Investment
promulgated in 1977 by the Communist Party. Ngo, supra note 122, at 68. The law became effective
on January 1, 1988. Vietnam Risk Guide, supra note 101.
126. Ngo, supra note 122, at 69.
In the late 1950s, while Vietnam was still struggling with foreign domination and
internal strife, Thailand began to plan the development of its domestic economy through
investment promotion. The Thai Government sought to actively encourage all forms
of investment by enacting the Industrial Promotion Act of 1954 .... Vietnam, with
Saigon's thriving entrepreneurial character, once posed a threat to Thailand's economic
security. After the fall of Saigon in 1975, however, the communist Vietnamese Govern-
ment sought to stifle the capitalistic business nature of many South Vietnamese by
condemning such behavior as subversive to the communist model. After decades of
clinging to failed communist economic policy, Vietnam now looks to Thailand as a
model for economic development.
Id.
127. Id. at 85.
128. Id. at 70. "This procedure creates delays, generates excessive bureaucracy, and opens doors
to corruption," which may have the effect of significantly hindering Vietnam's economic develop-
ment. Id.
129. Id. The approval process entails the submission of an application to the Ministry of External
Economic Relations (MEER). After examining each proposal, the MEER submits a report for review
by the state organ, which ultimately accepts or rejects the proposal. Id. at 95.
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Investment 30 is the governmental body that maintains general supervisory author-
ity over all foreign investment. 131 In contrast, the foreign investment laws of
Thailand require no such approval by its government prior to foreign investment
activity. "'
This type of incongruence is a primary example of the difficulties associated
with promoting economic reforms while maintaining strict controls on political
freedom, or "market socialism." While the rigid approval procedures do not
seem to be impairing Vietnam's ability to attract foreign investment-more than
500 companies from forty-two countries have invested in Vietnam thus far 13 -
obtaining the necessary licenses can still be difficult. By acting to limit short-term
investors looking for a way to make a quick buck, the Vietnamese Government
may at the same time be dissuading potential long-term investors.l13
Despite the initial approval procedure, the 1987 FIL does promise to open
Vietnam to substantial foreign investment by providing liberal rules governing
the forms of foreign investment. In article 3, the code authorizes foreign organiza-
tions or private persons to invest in any sector of the national economy and
encourages investment in areas involving high technology and infrastructure, as
well as those areas that will exploit Vietnam's vast natural resources and labor
force. 135 In order to further attract foreign investment, the law provides for gener-
130. In April 1989 the Vietnamese Government set up the State Committee for Co-operation and
Investment (SCCI) whose thirty technocrats have received training in various auditing applications
by World Bank and IMF officials. Investing in Vietnam; Another Quagmire?, ECONOMIST, Apr. 7,
1990, at 81. The personnel of the SCCI act as go-betweens for hopeful foreign investors and the
five ministries that must approve the investment projects. Id.
131. 1987 FIL, supra note 123. Articles 36, 37, and 38 set out the authority and responsibilities
of the state organ for management of foreign investment as follows: The State organ for management
of Foreign investment. Specifically, the state organ is vested with the overall authority to solve
matters related to the investment operation of foreign organizations and private persons in Vietnam
and shall have the following rights and responsibilities: assist and guide foreign and Vietnamese
partners in the negotiation and conclusion of business cooperation and joint venture contracts and
the establishment in Vietnam of enterprises with 100% foreign invested capital, as well as approve
those contracts and grant investment licenses; monitor and supervise the execution of business coopera-
tion and joint venture contracts and the operation of the enterprises with 100% foreign invested
capital; and analyze the economic activities of the enterprises with foreign invested capital. Id. arts.
36-38.
132. Ngo, supra note 122, at 70.
133. Simon Fluendy, Patience Is Key to Dealing with the Next Dragon, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Feb. 3, 1994, at 14, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
134. Id.
135. 1987 FIL, supra note 123, art. 3. Article 3 further states:
The Vietnamese State encourages foreign organizations or private persons to invest
in the following areas: 1. Implementation of major economic programs, export-oriented
production and import-substitution; 2. High-technology industries using skilled labor;
in-depth investment for exploitation and exhaustive utilization of potential resources
and for raising the output capacities of the existing economic establishments; 3. Labor-
intensive production using existing materials and natural resources available in Viet-
nam; 4. Building of infrastructure; facilities; Foreign currency-earning services: tour-
ism, ship repair, airport, seaport and other services.
Id.
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ous tax write-offs for foreign investment projects that generate exports, employ-
ment, and hard currency transfers. In addition, the Vietnamese Government has
eliminated its subsidies to state-run businesses, abolished price controls, reduced
corporate income tax rates to a maximum of 25 percent, down from 50 percent,
and now guarantees the full repatriation of profits. 136 Most importantly, however,
it allows foreigners to own and manage 100 percent of their enterprises in Viet-
nam, as compared to a maximum of 40 percent prior to the 1987 FIL.'37
More specifically, the 1987 FIL offers three ways for foreign investors to do
business in Vietnam. 138 First, article 5 establishes that "[a] foreign partner and
a Vietnamese partner may enter into contractual business cooperation, such as
production sharing cooperation." 139 Furthermore, article 5 provides that the ob-
ject and content of the business, as well as its rights, obligations, and responsibilit-
ies shall be apportioned between its partners by mutual agreement. This mutual
agreement will form the basis of the partnership and will be expressed in the
business cooperation contract. '40 Article 5 sets out the most basic means of foreign
investment, simple business contracts. However, while the business cooperation
contract does provide flexibility, it does not provide the limited liability or tax
benefits of the more complex forms of investment opportunities. 141
The second form of foreign investment allowed by the 1987 FIL is that of a
joint venture enterprise. Article 6 provides that two or more partners, 14 2 as in
the business cooperation contract mentioned above, may elect to engage in the
establishment of a joint venture. 143 As defined by the code, a joint venture "refers
to an enterprise jointly set up in Vietnam by the foreign and Vietnamese partners,
based on a joint venture contract or an agreement concluded between the govern-
ment of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and a foreign government."' 44 In
addition, article 6 states that a joint venture is granted the status of a legal person,
and is therefore subject to the laws of Vietnam. 14' Because of the limited liability
and tax breaks afforded to a joint venture, it is by far the most common method
136. Vietnam Risk Guide, supra note 101.
137. 1987 FIL, supra note 123.
138. Id. art. 4. "Foreign organization[s] and private persons may invest in the following forms:
1. Contractual business co-operation; 2. Joint venture enterprise or company, both referred to as
joint venture; 3. An enterprise with 100% foreign invested capital." Id. Although the 1987 FIL
provides for three forms of foreign investment, the law focuses much more attention on the latter
two methods of investment. Id.
139. Id. art. 5.
140. Id.
141. Nutt, supra note 117. For example, a business cooperation contract allows either party to
the contract to withdraw. Id. With this type of flexibility, however, comes an inherent source of
risk that may dissuade some potential investors from opting for this form of investment activity.
142. " 'The two partners' refers to the Vietnamese partner and the foreign partner." 1987 FIL,
supra note 123, art. 2.
143. Id. art. 6.
144. Id. art. 2.
145. Id. art. 6.
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of investment for foreign companies, accounting for 80 percent of the foreign
operations in Vietnam.'46
One of the key features of the 1987 FIL is the relaxation of the requirements
for contribution of capital with respect to the establishment of joint ventures.
Most importantly, article 8 provides that "[t]here shall be no ceiling on the
maximum contribution to the legal capital by a foreign partner or foreign partners
to a joint venture which by mutual consent shall not, however, be less than thirty
percent (30 %) of the legal capital." 147 This provision means that a foreign partner
to a joint venture in Vietnam may contribute an amount between 100 percent
and 30 percent of the total capital for the joint venture, as compared to a maximum
contribution of 40 percent under the old law. 148 The true significance of this
provision is that under such an investment structure, the "two partners share the
profits and bear the risks of a joint venture in accordance with the proportion
of their respective capital contribution. 149 Thus, under this new law, a foreign
investor may contribute up to 100 percent of the capital in a Vietnamese joint
venture and likewise receive up to 100 percent of the profits from its operations.
Moreover, article 12 of the 1987 FIL provides guidelines for the management
scheme in a joint venture. 5 0 This article states that each joint venture will have
a board of management, which will be its leading or governing body.' 5' The
provision further sets out guidelines for the selection of the board of management,
the chairman of the board, a general director, and the deputy general directors,
as well as setting forth some of their responsibilities. For example, the act states
that "[e]ach partner to the joint venture shall appoint their nominees to the Board
of Management in proportion to their respective capital contributions to the ven-
ture," '52 and "[t]he General Director and Deputy General Directors shall be
nominated by the Board of Management to handle the daily business of the joint
146. Nutt, supra note 117.
147. 1987 FIL, supra note 123, art. 8.
148. Id.; see also Vietnam Risk Guide, supra note 101.
149. 1987 FIL, supra note 123, art. 10.
150. Nutt, supra note 117. While the joint venture with a local partner is the most frequently
chosen method of foreign investment, "it locks the partners into a tight corporate structure, which
requires unanimous decisions by a board of management. This makes it difficult for the foreign
partner to get capital out of Vietnam." Id. These considerations will probably not have an adverse
effect on the number of foreign investors seeking to establish joint venture enterprises in Vietnam;
however, such considerations should be recognized.
151. 1987 FIL, supra note 123, art. 12. "The most important matters related to the organization
and operation of the joint venture such as the orientation of its activities, business planning, key
personnel shall be decided by the Board of Management on the principle of unanimity." Id. art.
13.
152. Id. art. 12. Although appointing representatives to the board by proportion of each partner's
capital contribution appears to give the major contributor all of the decision-making power, articles
12 and 13 provide other measures to balance this inequality. Id. arts. 12-13. For example, each
partner of ajoint venture is guaranteed at least one of its nominees elected to the board of management,
and more importantly, article 13 provides that the decision-making process for the Board will be
one of unanimity. Id.; see supra note 150 and accompanying text.
WINTER 1994
1016 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
venture and shall be responsible to the Board of Management for the operation
of the joint venture."' 53 In addition, article 12 includes a unique restriction that
provides that either the general director or the first deputy general director of
the board of management must be a Vietnamese citizen.'54
The third and final means of investment authorized by the 1987 FIL is in the
form of a wholly foreign-owned enterprise, which offers foreign investors limited
liability and full control.' 55 Like a joint venture, the wholly foreign-owned enter-
prise will also receive the status of a legal person, and therefore will be equally
subject to the laws of Vietnam. 56 Article 14 provides that
[f]oreign organizations and private persons may establish in Vietnam enterprises with
100% foreign invested capital, in which case they shall assume full management of
the enterprise, be subject to supervision of the State organ for management of foreign
investment, be entitled to enjoy the rights and liable to carry out all obligations stated
in the investment license. 157
This provision may prove to be one of the more important aspects of the law.
By allowing foreign investors the opportunity to own and operate their business
ventures in Vietnam, the Vietnamese economy stands to gain much more from
the influence of foreign expertise in management and production, not to mention
the much needed increase in foreign capital.
The 1987 FIL treats joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned enterprises very
similarly, referring to both of them as "enterprises with foreign invested capi-
tal." ' 5 In the interest of alleviating Vietnam's soaring unemployment rate, 159
article 16 demands that Vietnamese citizens be given priority when an enterprise
with foreign invested capital recruits personnel.'6° This kind of a demand is to
be expected in a country as poor as Vietnam, which desperately needs to involve
its own people in the economic revitalization policy of doi moi. Interestingly,
however, article 15 of the law limits the duration of such enterprises to a period
161of twenty years, allowing for the possibility of extension where necessary.
While this provision has no stated purpose, it would appear that the Vietnamese
Government is attempting to use liberal rules to promote substantial foreign
153. Id. art. 12.
154. Id.
155. Nutt, supra note 117. When the U.S. embargo was lifted, there were about 120 wholly
owned foreign ventures in Vietnam, most of which were food processing or textile production opera-
tions owned by companies from Hong Kong or Taiwan. Id.
156. 1987 FIL, supra note 123, art. 14.
157. Id.
158. Id. art. 2.
159. Kahn, supra note 35. Unemployment in Vietnam has soared to as high as 20% and has been
fueled by the return of 600,000 troops returning from duty in Cambodia. Id.
160. 1987 FIL, supra note 123, art. 16. However, the article does allow that "[w]here high
technical qualifications are required for which Vietnamese personnel are not available, the enterprise
may recruit expatriate personnel." Id.
161. Id. art. 15. This provision, however, does not specify what circumstances will qualify as
to make an extension "necessary." Id.
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investment and build the Vietnamese economy to a level that would eventually
support Vietnamese businesses without foreign ownership. This goal may, how-
ever, have the undesired effect of deterring some foreign investors from commit-
ting large amounts of capital to a venture that has a limited lifetime of twenty
years.
Despite some ideological differences inherent in the new law,' 62 the 1987 FIL
does offer several other important features. For instance, foreign enterprises and
private persons who reinvest part of their share of the profits will be entitled to
receive a refund on the tax already paid on that reinvested profit. 163 The new
law contains several additional tax incentives for foreign investors, such as article
27, which provides that:
[d]epending on the areas of investments, the fields of investment, the scale of capital
contribution, the volume of export, the volume of necessary import-substitutions which
have not been produced at home yet, or if any, not enough, the nature and duration,
ajoint venture may be exempted by the State organ for management of foreign investment
from payment of profit tax for a maximum period of two years counting from the first
profit-making year and allowed a 50% reduction of profit tax for a maximum period
of two succeeding years. In the course of its operation, losses incurred by a joint venture
in any year may be carried over to the next year and made up with the profits of the
succeeding years but not exceeding five years.'('
While these kinds of incentives and exemptions can be very attractive to foreign
investors, article 27 expressly refers only to joint ventures; the article does not
mention contractual business cooperations or wholly foreign-owned enter-
prises. 165 As a result, it is unclear whether foreign investment enterprises in any
form other than that of a joint venture will be allowed to take advantage of these
incentives. This type of ambiguity is another example of how the 1987 FIL, while
showing a strong commitment to the establishment of a much needed investment
promotion scheme, retains some structural and textual flaws that should be
addressed by the Vietnamese Government in order to attract the more cautious
would-be foreign investors. This need for clarification is particularly true with
respect to large foreign corporations interested in setting up wholly owned subsidi-
aries in Vietnam, which will surely demand a more precise understanding of the
legal ramifications and financial risks associated with such an investment.
Arguably the most significant contribution that the 1987 FIL will make to the
promotion of foreign investment in Vietnam is in the area of personal and invest-
162. An example of such ideological difference in the 1987 FIL can be found in article 31, which
states: "The enterprise with foreign invested capital shall deposit with the Vietnamese national budget
the required sums to cover social insurance for the personnel of the enterprise in accordance with
the provisions of Vietnamese laws." Id. art. 31. Although many countries may have similar provisions,
these kinds of socialist requirements may actually act as a deterrent to some foreign investors.
163. Id. art. 32.
164. Id. art. 27; see also art. 28 (providing for further reductions of profit tax in exceptional
cases where encouragement of investment is needed).
165. Id. art. 27.
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ment security. 166 In a developing country such as Vietnam, which remains under
the control of the Communist Party whose economic experiment of "market
socialism" is far from a proven success, foreign investment offers great opportu-
nity as well as considerable risk. Realizing that this situation creates an obstacle
to foreign investment, the drafters of the 1987 FIL included certain guarantees
and protections that will undoubtedly help to promote foreign investment and
revitalize the Vietnamese economy. Of these guarantees, perhaps the most im-
portant is protection from requisition or nationalization.
The 1987 FIL explicitly states that "the invested capital and assets of a foreign
organization and private person shall not be requisitioned and expropriated by
administrative measures. The enterprise with foreign invested capital shall not
be nationalized.' ' 67 This measure guarantees that the Vietnamese Government
will not seize the property or assets of an enterprise with foreign invested capital,
a point of much concern among foreign investors who remain apprehensive of
the control still wielded by the Communist Party. Such guarantees and protections
are vital elements in a promotion strategy to attract foreign investors who, in
some cases, would be making extremely large commitments of capital. These
capital contributions may include currency, plant and equipment, patents, and
technological processes, 168 and therefore, their protection is naturally of the high-
est importance to any potential investor.
Finally, the 1987 FIL grants foreign organizations and private persons the
right to repatriate abroad their share of profits and invested capital, and other
sums of money and assets that are under their legal ownership. 69 This privilege
means that a foreign organization or private person may transfer such capital
assets back to its native country while working in Vietnam, or may do so upon
leaving Vietnam. 70 Furthermore, article 23 extends this right to individual em-
ployees of foreign investment ventures in Vietnam and provides that expatriates
working in Vietnam for an enterprise with foreign invested capital or carrying
out a business cooperation contract in Vietnam may repatriate their incomes after
payment of income taxes as prescribed by Vietnamese laws. 171
Although the 1987 FIL is a law that contains some structural and textual imper-
fections, it is a remarkably bold step in the direction of free market capitalism
for a country whose government still clings to the political control inherent in
166. As part of the investment guarantee chapter of the 1987 FIL, article 20 provides that: "the
Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam shall guarantee a fair and equitable treatment in
regard to any foreign organization and private person who invests in Vietnam." Id. art. 20. By this
provision, it is reasonably safe to assume, although not expressly stated, that the protection also
applies to those foreign individuals who did not personally invest in Vietnam, but who nonetheless
live in Vietnam while employed by an enterprise with foreign invested capital.
167. Id. art. 21.
168. Id. art. 7.
169. Id. art. 22.
170. Id.
171. Id. art. 23.
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its Communist ideology. The passage of such fundamental changes in its laws,
although the alternative of central planning was admittedly failing,' shows a
firm commitment by the Vietnamese Government to build a strong and stable
Vietnamese economy. 173 Accordingly, many other nations have already invested
large amounts of capital in Vietnam, hoping to take advantage of its tremendous
economic potential. Between 1988 and 1994 the Vietnamese Government ap-
proved 857 foreign investment projects worth $7.8 billion. Taiwan, Hong Kong,
South Korea, Japan, France, Malaysia, Australia, Singapore, Britain, and the
Netherlands were the ten investors.174 Foreign investments from industrialized
nations such as these amounted to almost $2.5 billion in 1992, more than double
the 1991 figure.' 75
The success that Vietnam has already experienced in implementing its new
economic structure is indeed encouraging. However, until recently, the U.S.
embargo continued to loom over Vietnam, making these successes bittersweet.
The achievement of surviving the hardships of socialism was tarnished somewhat
by the realization that without the support of the United States, Vietnam's goal
172. Pritchard, supra note 108. As Dr. Oanh points out regarding an example of the follies of
central economic planning: "They had the good sense to throw out their bad old ideas as far as rice
farming was concerned, and stopped trying to control the farmers every step of the way." Id. He
also added, "We're now the world's third-biggest rice exporter after Thailand and the US. Slowly,
other ideas have been tossed aside-nervously at first, but now at a much faster pace." Id. In place
of the old laws, the Vietnamese Government is attempting to enact legislation that will promote
foreign investment and strengthen the Vietnamese economy. Id.; see also Vietnam's Goal Is to Attract
Investment of $20 Billion from Foreigners in a Decade, INT'L TRADE REP., Apr. 28, 1993 [hereinafter
Vietnam's Goal]. In addition to the 1987 FIL, the National Assembly of Vietnam has adopted the
use of build-operate-transfer contracts, which allow a foreign party to build and operate a project
and transfer the project back to the Vietnamese Government after a specific period of operation. Id.
These contracts are most frequently used in the building of infrastructure. Id. Most importantly, the
government has stated that although its laws may be subject to many revisions, "all laws are aimed
at serving the interest of the people." Id.
173. While the 1987 FIL is indeed a progressive act by Vietnam in an effort to promote foreign
investment, the true test of its commitment may be in whether it will allow the interests and the
security of the Communist Party to take precedence over the improvement of its economy. The rigid
approval process for foreign investment is an excellent illustration of the struggle between Vietnam's
desire to expand its economy and the Communist Party's attempt to maintain political control. It
has been suggested that "[t]he current approval process only frustrates Vietnam's desire to rapidly
attract the foreign investment it desperately needs." Ngo, supra note 122, at 98. As a result, the
economic interests of Vietnam may be best served by an amendment to the 1987 FIL eliminating
the initial approval process for foreign investors. Such action would serve to increase the credibility
of Vietnam's policy of doi moi as well as provide a positive indication that " 'market socialism' is
not just a ploy by the [C]ommunists to retain power." Id. at 98.
174. John Rogers, Oil and Gas Main Prospect for U.S. Firms, REUTER ASIA-PAc. Bus. REP.,
Feb. 2, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
175. Kahn, supra note 35. As of 1992 Taiwan was the largest investor in Vietnam, accounting
for 25% of its total foreign investment, followed by Hong Kong, which invested about 11% of the
total. Id. In addition, while foreign investors have promised to deliver nearly $5 billion, the Vietnamese
Government claims it needs to spend an estimated $22 billion in order to rebuild and upgrade the
country's deteriorated infrastructure. Id.
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of becoming the next "Asian tiger" would be considerably more difficult to
attain.
IV. United States-Vietnam Relations
As the U.S. embargo dragged on through the 1980s, the reasons for maintaining
it began to fade. Unfortunately, memories of the Vietnam War did not fade quite
as easily for many Americans. 17 6 Convinced that the embargo was the best means
of maintaining bargaining power over the Vietnamese, particularly on the issue of
American MIAs, the United States Government continued to enforce the economic
sanctions. 177 However, the Vietnamese managed to overcome the ravages of war,
the hardships of a failed socialist economic system, and the effects of the U.S.
embargo to establish a framework from which to build a strong economy. Thus,
foreign corporations and private investors from other nations began to take advan-
tage of the opportunities in Vietnam's developing economy, while U.S. business-
men were forced to watch from the sidelines. As a result, the United States
Government came under considerable pressure from the American business com-
munity to lift the embargo. 17' American businessmen felt that by maintaining the
embargo, the United States was actually losing millions of dollars by preventing
its own companies from taking advantage of the opportunities available in
Vietnam. 1
79
In 1991, realizing that the American business community would not stand
for being shut out of an increasingly attractive market, President George Bush
introduced a four-phase "road map" towards improving relations between the
two countries.1 0 This road map required that four conditions be met before
relations could be improved. These were: (1) the resolution of the status of U.S.
176. Colonel George Shine, USAF (Ret.) and his wife Helen, sent three sons to Vietnam. Their
youngest son was killed, the middle son was wounded, and the oldest is still listed as missing in
action. Mrs. Shine:
I cannot say I was surprised when we were told he [the youngest] had been killed.
One of my initial reactions was, "Thank God he's not missing." Then two years
later, Tony-our oldest-was declared missing. . . . We know nothing about him.
We know his plane disappeared in Laos, and that's that.
Colonel Shine: "I thought that if we didn't hear yesterday, maybe today, maybe tomorrow. We'd
still like to get some word that. . . he's been killed; that we've got his remains coming back. Mostly
I think we'll just never know." Hearts and Minds, supra note 1. In April of 1988 the United States
and Vietnam conducted the first joint field investigation on MIAs. Key Dates of US Embargo, BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb. 4, 1994, at 12 [hereinafter Key Dates].
177. The influential lobby of veterans continued to support the imposition of the embargo, fearing
that without it the United States would lack the economic leverage necessary to compel Vietnam to
account for the remaining American MIAs. Business Leaders, supra note 14.
178. Ngo, supra note 122, at 84.
179. McDermott, supra note 2. James Rockwell, a business consultant from Seattle stated, "The
embargo is costing us hundreds of millions of dollars, thousands of jobs. It's going to add up to
billions by the time they get rid of it." Id. Mr. Rockwell was the first American given permission
by the United States Government to open an office in Hanoi. Id.
180. Ngo, supra note 122, at 84.
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MIAs; (2) the release of all political prisoners, observance of basic human rights,
respect for private property, and a move toward a multiparty representative form
of government; (3) the withdrawal of all military and intelligence personnel from
Cambodia; and (4) the use of Vietnam's influence to resolve the Cambodian
conflict peacefully. '
81
In April of 1991 Vietnam agreed to the establishment of a U.S. office in Hanoi
to help determine the fate of American MIAs. 182 During his subsequent twelve-day
trip to the South Pacific, 8 3 President Bush applauded the steps toward improved
relations and announced on January 4, 1992, that the United States, after being
"strong, determined and patient, [could] finally entertain realistic hopes of build-
ing lasting ties of interest and affection" with Vietnam. '4 Despite such progress,
however, the status of more than 2,000 U.S. servicemen listed as missing in
action from the Vietnam War was then, and continues to be, the major obstacle
to normalized relations between the United States and Vietnam. 185
Later in 1992, in response to further Vietnamese cooperation with U.S. efforts
to account for its missing servicemen, 18 6 and as an incentive for continued coopera-
tion, President Bush eased the embargo by permitting sales of food, medicine,
and some agricultural items for humanitarian projects in Vietnam. 187 Finally,
during his last days in office after losing the 1992 election to Bill Clinton, Bush
further relaxed the embargo on December 14, 1992, by an amendment that al-
lowed U.S. companies to open offices, conduct feasibility studies, and sign con-
tracts in Vietnam. 8 8 Each of these contracts, however, would be dependent upon
the lifting of the embargo and could not be legally executed until that time.8 9
Although a positive move forward, the hesitation to remove the embargo alto-
gether frustrated both Vietnamese and American businessmen; multi-million dol-
lar deals "in the pipeline" were waiting to be executed, but were delayed by
the continued embargo. 190
When President Clinton took office, many expected that he would lift the
181. Id.
182. Id. In addition, Vietnam had already withdrawn all of its military forces from Cambodia in
1989. International Relationships, supra note 100.
183. Bush Expected to Lift U.S. Trade Embargo on Cambodia, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Jan.
2, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File. During his trip, President Bush visited
Australia, Singapore, South Korea, and Japan. Id.
184. Michael Richardson, U.S. Warms to New Ties with Vietnam, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 7,
1992, available in LEXIS, Intnew Library, Allwid File.
185. Ngo, supra note 122, at 84.
186. Id. In 1992 Hanoi agreed to provide the United States with all of its information regarding
American POWs and MIAs. Id. The information included over 4,000 photos, various artifacts, and
detailed military records pertaining to Americans captured by the Vietnamese during the war. Id.
187. International Relationships, supra note 100.
188. Key Dates, supra note 176.
189. Kahn, supra note 35.
190. U.S. Businesses Increase, supra note 96.
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embargo altogether. He did not.' 9' Clinton did, however, continue Bush's plan
to ease the embargo as the Vietnamese continued to make progress in compliance
with demands from Washington. 192 In July 1993, noting Vietnam's cooperation
on the MIA issue, President Clinton lifted the U.S. opposition to the settlement
of Vietnam's $140 million in arrears owed to the IMF. 93 While keeping the
embargo in place, the concession removed the restrictions on multilateral lending
to Vietnam, allowing it to borrow money in order to begin repairing its crumbled
infrastructure.' 94 This move, however, was not without its opponents. Those
businessmen who wished to see an end to the embargo altogether complained
that merely lifting the IMF and World Bank restrictions without also allowing
U.S. companies to invest in Vietnam was absurd.1 95 "It's unthinkable that [U.S.]
taxpayer dollars could be used to make IMF loans [to Vietnam], but American
companies wouldn't be able to bid on IMF projects [in Vietnam]. ' 1 96 "The
combination of the U.S. embargo and the release of the international funding
has the odd effect of locking U.S. companies out of one of the most lucrative
development markets on the globe at exactly the moment the big money is about
to be spent."' 97 As Nguyen Duy Le of the Vietnamese Chamber of Commerce
observed of the ongoing U.S. embargo, "All those big projects, the infrastructure
191. Veteran Groups Urge Clinton Not to Lift Vietnam Embargo, INT'L TRADE REP., Apr. 14,
1993, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, Intrad File. One reason for Clinton's hesitation was a
1972 document received by the United States on April 8, 1992. Id. The 1972 document was discovered
in Moscow's archives and describes about 700 prisoners whose existence was kept secret from the
United States. Id. If authenticated, the document would have proven that the Vietnamese had been
consistently lying to U.S. officials about U.S. prisoners of war and soldiers missing in action. Id.
Although Vietnamese officials denied the document's authenticity, the discovery incited various
veteran groups to again lobby against the lifting of the embargo until the Vietnamese have made a
full accounting of POWs and MIAs. Id.
192. In 1992 President Bush adopted a schedule for the accounting of American POWs/MIAs in
Vietnam and vowed to continue to normalize relations with Hanoi as long as the Vietnamese continue
to meet his agenda. Ngo, supra note 122, at 84. Likewise, in July 1993 President Clinton also
outlined four areas critical to normalizing relations between the United States and Vietnam: "obtaining
additional remains, resolution of discrepancy cases, trilateral investigation with Laos, and access to
POW/MIA-related documents." U.S. Firms NowAllowedto Work on Vietnam Development Projects,
INT'L TRADE REP., Sept. 15, 1993, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, Intrad File [hereinafter U.S.
Firms]. Although some progress had been made in each of these areas, the White House stated that
while these efforts were welcome, the results were not yet sufficient to justify lifting the embargo.
Id. "To ensure further progress is achieved, our military personnel in Vietnam involved in the POW/
MIA mission will continue to travel throughout the country to investigate leads on live sightings
and locations of remains, interview Vietnamese witnesses, and excavate possible crash sites and
burial locations." Id.
193. Key Dates, supra note 176.
194. Id.
195. McDermott, supra note 2.
196. U.S. Businesses Increase, supra note 96. William Beddow, Caterpillar's Washington manager
of governmental affairs.
197. McDermott, supra note 2.
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work, you have missed a big part of the pie. If this continues, you will miss it
all.''1
98
On September 13, 1993, still under heavy pressure from the American business
sector and with the deadline for the extension of the embargo approaching,'99
President Clinton took the next step toward normalized relations with Vietnam
by signing a determination that allowed U.S. companies to compete for and work
on development projects in Vietnam funded by various international financial
institutions.200 While this action was a significant move toward the improvement
of relations between the United States and Vietnam, Clinton made clear his plans
to maintain the general U.S. embargo against Vietnam.20' In addition, President
Clinton assured opponents of the action that "[t]he issue of whether the Vietnam-
ese have made sufficient progress in POW/MIA accounting will remain under
constant review" and that Vietnam must still do more to account for American
prisoners of war and soldiers missing in action before the embargo will be lifted.2 °2
As of September 1993 more than 170 U.S. companies, including such corporate
giants as Boeing, Caterpillar, IBM, Chrysler, and General Electric, had applied
to do business in Vietnam.0 3 As 1993 came to a close, President Clinton was
under increasing pressure to lift the embargo, but four obstacles remained. In
early 1994 however, within a period of two weeks, all four of these obstacles
were removed: (1) U. S. doubts about Vietnamese cooperation in efforts to obtain
"the fullest possible accounting" of the U.S. servicemen still listed as missing
in action from the Vietnam War. Admiral Charles Larson, the man in charge of
U.S. units conducting the search, praised Vietnam's efforts. He said his job
would be easier if the former enemies had normal relations. (2) Two Soviet
documents released in 1992 that raised questions about Hanoi's statements in
the early 1970s on the number of U.S. prisoners of war it held. A U.S. intelligence
study released on January 24, 1994, debunked both documents, reducing their
usefulness as ammunition for opponents of normal ties with Vietnam. (3) A lack
198. Id.; see also U.S. Businesses Increase, supra note 96. Frustrated that this potentially lucrative
market is being utilized by other countries and competing foreign companies, "American business
[was) coalescing into trade groups, sending private trade missions to Hanoi, and accelerating its
lobbying [of] the White House." Id.
199. By law, Clinton had until September 14, 1993, to decide whether to renew the Vietnamese
embargo, and while several concessions were made, he made it clear that the embargo was still in
place. U.S. Congressional Delegation to Examine Trade Issues on Trip to Asia This Month, INT'L
TRADE REP., Aug. 11, 1993, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, Intrad File.
200. U.S. Firms, supra note 192. This determination meant that American companies would be
able to compete for the many lucrative contracts that will necessarily result from Vietnam's endeavor
to rebuild and repair its deteriorated infrastructure.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. McDermott, supra note 2.
204. John Rogers, Key Elements in Place for End to U.S. Embargo on Vietnam, REUTER LIBR.
REP., Feb. 2, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
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of clear political backing. The U.S. Senate vote on January 27, 1994, urging
Clinton to lift the embargo gave him the political muscle he needed to face
vociferous opposition from veterans' groups. (4) Allegations that Commerce
Secretary Ron Brown received $700,000 from Vietnam through an intermediary
to work for an end to the embargo. Brown and Hanoi denied the allegations, but
they made it difficult for Clinton to act. News broke on February 1, 1994, that
the U.S. Justice Department had cleared Brown of the allegations."'
Finally, confident in the justifications of his decision, 2°6 and bolstered by politi-
cal support, President Clinton lifted the trade embargo against Vietnam on Febru-
ary 3, 1994.207 In his announcement, Clinton stated that the key to continued
progress lies in expanding contacts with Vietnam, and added, "I have made the
judgment that the best way to ensure cooperation from Vietnam and to continue
getting the information Americans want on POWs and MIAs is to end the trade
embargo.' 208 By lifting the embargo, Clinton put an end to an era that began
almost thirty years ago on May 4, 1964, when the United States imposed an
embargo on North Vietnam in response to attacks against South Vietnam. 2 9
However, while taking this major step forward, President Clinton made clear
that "these actions do not constitute a normalization of our relationships. Before
that happens, we must have more progress, more cooperation, and more an-
swers. " 210
A. ADVANTAGES TO INVESTING IN VIETNAM
Like several of its Southeast Asian neighbors, Vietnam is becoming an increas-
ingly attractive site for foreign investors.21" ' Besides the adoption of the 1987
FIL, which has made investment in Vietnam a more appealing option to foreign
205. Id.
206. Business Leaders, supra note 14. In a meeting with veterans' groups and MIA relatives
before announcing the lifting of the embargo, President Clinton said that he respected their views
and shared their desire to know the fate of all MIAs. Id.
207. Id.
208. U.S. Embargo Against Vietnam Lifted, XINHUA GEN. OVERSEAs NEws SERVICE, Feb. 3,
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File [hereinafter U.S. Embargo].
209. Key Dates, supra note 176.
210. U.S. Embargo, supra note 208; see Giacomo, supra note 81. Currently, Vietnam is one of
only nine countries that does not enjoy most-favored-nation status and thus far no plans have evolved
for a trade agreement with Vietnam or for granting the desired most-favored-nation status. See also
Robert Templer, Full U.S.-Vietnam Ties Some Way Off Despite Liaison Office Accord, AGENCE
FRANCE PRSSE, May 27, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
211. Ngo, supra note 122, at 67.
During the 1980s, Southeast Asia attracted many foreign investors who capitalized
on the region's low wages and abundant natural resources to maximize their profits.
Southeast Asian countries, such as Thailand, benefited from the transfer of technology,
exchange of managerial skills and improvement of living standards. The development
of the region, as a whole, is considered an economic miracle.
Id. n.82.
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individuals and companies, Vietnam offers many other advantages and opportuni-
ties for foreign investors. The most important of these is economic potential.
Currently, Vietnam offers some of the best economic potential in the world.
Although it remains on the United Nations' list of "least developed nations,'" 21 2
Vietnam is rapidly emerging as the next "Asian tiger." 213 Moreover, following
the lifting of the U.S. embargo, the Vietnamese economy will benefit greatly
from the added U.S. business influence.214 While increased competition will be
the immediate effect, there will also be a significant financial effect as international
banks become less fearful of making medium- and long-term loans to Vietnam. 215
In addition to increased investment, most foreign competitors realize that other
benefits will accompany the infusion of U.S. business in Vietnam, including the
opportunity to trade in the U.S. market without fear of consumer backlash. 2t 6
Despite being one of the poorest countries in the world, Vietnam is rich in
natural resources. Specifically, the nation possesses an abundance of petroleum,
coal, and natural gas.21 7 For example, Vietnamese oil production far exceeds that
of China, 218 and many industry analysts contend that Vietnam's infant petroleum
industry could make it a major oil exporter by the turn of the century.2 9 Some
estimates claim that Vietnam could possess the world's fourth largest oil reserve,
while others have estimated a range of between 1.5 and 3.0 billion barrels.22 °
In December 1993 Mobil Oil Corporation-the second largest U.S. oil com-
pany-won a contract to explore Vietnam's "Blue Dragon" offshore oil field.22'
With the U.S. embargo now lifted, Mobil will be able to exercise its option to
212. Vietnam Risk Guide, supra note 101.
213. Whitaker, supra note 73. The term "Asian tiger" has been used to describe the economies
of several countries in Southeast Asia. Taiwan, Singapore, Thailand, and now Vietnam are all
examples, or soon will be, of the great economic miracle of Southeast Asia. Id.
214. Sherry, supra note 99. Although the embargo has shielded Asian and European investors
from competition with American companies, most are glad to see the embargo lifted as it will mean
increased business activity for the entire region. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Ngo, supra note 122, at 77.
218. Id.
219. Vietnam, Once Isolated, Poised for Significant Role in Oil and Gas, OIL & GAS J., July
15, 1991, available in LEXIS, Admrty Library, Oil Gas File.
220. Vietnam, MINING ANN. REV., June 1991, available in LEXIS, Energy Library, Minrev
File. In addition, the nation's undeveloped coal industry has been revitalized due to coal-mining
feasibility studies conducted by Australia's BHP Petroleum. Sarah Sargent, Vietnam: BHP, Vietnam
Sign Coal Exploration Deal, AUSTL. FIN. REV., May 11, 1990, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library,
Vietnam File. Such studies estimate that the coal reserves in northern Vietnam on the Khe Chain
and Halam anthracite deposits may be in the hundreds of millions of tons. Id.
221. Rogers, supra note 174. Mobil owns a 72.5% interest in the drilling area containing the
"Blue Dragon" field; PetroVietnam-the Vietnamese state oil company-owns a 15% interest, and
Zarubejinef-a Russian company-owns a 12.5 % interest in the field, which industry experts believe
to contain 100 million to 300 million barrels of oil. Mobil, Partners to Probe Vietnam Coast for
Oil, Gas, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, Dec. 21, 1993, at A15 [hereinafter Mobil].
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drill for oil off the Vietnamese coast.222 In so doing, Mobil would be the first
American oil company to conduct drilling activities in Vietnam since the end of
the war nearly 20 years ago. The company struck oil in 1975 off the coast of
what was then South Vietnam but was forced to pull out after Saigon fell to
Communist forces.223
The vast natural resources of Vietnam encompass more than petroleum and
minerals. Vietnam has an abundance of farmland, an important natural resource
for a nation that is 85 percent agricultural,224 and is currently the world's third
largest exporter of rice.225 In addition, extensive forests cover much of the coun-
try's 329,707 square kilometers of land, enough to support a large lumber industry
if properly developed.226 Vietnam also possesses a number of rivers that, if har-
nessed, could generate hydroelectric power. 227 Besides its potential for oil explora-
tion and production, Vietnam's expansive coastline offers not only a considerable
capacity for a fishing industry, but also locations for much needed ports and
harbors to support its increasing foreign trade activity.225
Furthermore, Vietnam's vast coastal properties will create opportunities for
hotel and resort chains.229 More than 3,000 international businessmen are cur-
rently based in Hanoi, and with the U.S. embargo lifted, that number continues
to grow.23° While Vietnam has museums, art galleries, and parks, it lacks other
recreational facilities. 23' The surge of business activity will undoubtedly be accom-
panied by a demand for leisure activities such as golf.2 32 In addition to attracting
more business, the construction of new hotels and recreational facilities will also
provide a boost to the Vietnamese economy and jobs for thousands of Vietnamese
233
citizens.
222. Business Leaders, supra note 14. Under the terms of the U.S. embargo, Mobil was authorized
to gather seismic data and conduct test drilling, but could not pump or sell any oil. Mobil, supra
note 221.
223. Business Leaders, supra note 14; Mobil, supra note 221.
224. Vietnam Risk Guide, supra note 101. But see Fact Sheet, POL. RISK SERVICES, June 1, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allows File [hereinafter Fact Sheet]. The 1992 estimate of
Vietnam's workforce distribution was as follows: 70% agriculture; 22% services; and 8% industry
and commerce. Id.
225. Pritchard, supra note 108.
226. Ngo, supra note 122, at 78.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Anne Mcllroy, Vietnam Waiting for U.S. to End War, TORONTO STAR, May 2, 1993, at
F3. The demand for hotel rooms is not confined to the coastline. Id. Ironically, the "Hanoi Hilton,"
the jail that once confined U.S. prisoners of war, is now being turned into a luxury hotel. Id.
230. Vietnamese Build Golf Courses to Court U.S. Businessmen, CNN, Feb. 9, 1994, Transcript
#532-9, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
231. Id.
232. Id. A total of four golf courses are expected to open in Vietnam in 1994. Id.
233. Id. For example, most of the work on the golf course at the new King's Island Golf Resort,
just outside of Hanoi, is being done by army units now working in the private sector. Id. "Most
of these workers have never seen a lawn mower but in just a few weeks [have] learned the delicate
job of grooming greens .... We're teaching them new skills." Id.
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One of Vietnam's most important resources, however, is its population of
seventy million people.234 This abundance of human resources offers an attractive
advantage to prospective investors.235 Vietnam boasts a highly literate labor
force,236 which will reduce the time, effort, and costs required to train new
employees for work in foreign-owned establishments. In addition, a large popula-
tion coupled with high unemployment 237 will result in foreign-owned enterprises
being able to capitalize on low wages, thereby increasing profitability.238 More-
over, Vietnamese workers are eager to achieve economic security. "Mentally
we are ready. Our biggest advantage is that we have what is basically a Chinese
culture, with a Confucian work ethic.' ,239 Capitalizing on the high-quality work
that the Vietnamese labor force will produce, foreign investors will again increase
the efficiency of their operations and therefore their profitability. 24
Most important, however, is Vietnam's need to rebuild its infrastructure,
much of which remains in a state of ruin from the war and years of neglect.
Of Vietnam's 100,000 kilometers of road, less than 15 percent are paved,241
and many of the nation's roads and bridges have not been fully repaired since
the end of the war. For example, Vietnam's Highway 1, which links Hanoi to
Ho Chi Minh City, suffered heavy damage during the war.2 42 Today, although it
narrows to a dirt path in some places, Highway 1 remains the primary link
between north and south Vietnam.243 Ports and railways are in generally poor
234. Business Leaders, supra note 14; see also Fact Sheet, supra note 224. As of mid-1993
Vietnam had a population of 68.9 million in 1992 and the following population statistics: 2% annual
growth; 51 infant deaths per thousand; 41% of the population under the age of 15; 22% urban
population; 3.4% urban growth; and a 74% literacy rate. Id.
235. Ngo, supra note 122, at 78.
236. A 1990 literacy study estimated "that 88% (92% of males, and 84% of females) of Vietnamese
age 15 and over can read and write." U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD FACTBOOK,
VIETNAM (1984), available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Vietnam File.
237. Vietnam Risk Guide, supra note 101. Unemployment, which was as high as 20% or more
in some cities, was aggravated by returning workers from Eastern Europe and by the demobilization
of 600,000 troops in Cambodia. Id. In addition, the Vietnamese Government expects nearly 200,000
contract workers to return from abroad over the next two years, a development that will not only
exacerbate the unemployment problem, but will also deprive the nation of roughly US$150 million
per year in hard currency remittances. Id.
238. Ngo, supra note 122, at 78. Vietnam's highly literate labor force and high unemployment
will allow foreign-owned low technology factories to pay workers a comparatively low wage of
US$30 per month, half of the average wage in nearby Thailand. Id.
239. Whitaker, supra note 73. According to Mr. Truc, speaking of the Vietnamese exemplary
work ethic, "[tihat is not true of Cambodia, Laos or Burma-which is why I am not so optimistic
about them. . . . [W]hat hurt Vietnamese pride was the discovery since coming out of isolation that
they were at least 15 to 20 years behind people they had traditionally looked down on, such as the
Thais, the Malaysians, and the Indonesians." Id.
240. Id.
241. Vietnam Risk Guide, supra note 101.
242. 10 US Companies in Running to Repair Vietnam's Main Highway, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
Jan. 23, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File [hereinafter 10 US Companies].
243. Id.
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condition as well, which further hinders the expansion of foreign trade and
distribution of goods.2 44 "As a result, less than one-third of the goods trans-
ported in Viet Nam are moved by modern means; the majority is transported
on carrying poles, horses and carts. As for the transportation of humans, Viet
Nam remains in the bicycle age." 245 The shabby state of Vietnam's infrastruc-
ture will certainly be viewed by some as a disadvantage to doing business
there. However, foreign companies will have the opportunity to compete for
the estimated $20 billion in infrastructure contracts needed to rebuild and
modernize the country.246
While American business has lot of catching-up to do with its rivals from
France as well as Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, Japan, and Singapore,
thirty-four U.S. firms had already been licensed to open representative offices
in Vietnam when the embargo was lifted.247 Some of the U.S. companies with
a strong presence in the country are Bank of America and Citibank, Philip Morris,
Otis Elevator, IBM and Digital Equipment Corp., Carrier Corp., Caterpillar,
DuPont Far East, Motorola, and Kodak.2 48 Furthermore, in April 1994, around
50 U.S. firms displayed their wares as part of "Vietnamerica Expo 94," the
first trade fair of American products in Vietnam.249
Indeed, opportunity abounds in Vietnam today, as evidenced by the massive
investment of capital by other industrialized nations. 2 0 Following the fall of
the Saigon Government and the reunification of Vietnam under the Communist
regime, Western influence was indeed diminished, but was not entirely eradi-
cated. The Communist Government in Hanoi continued to look to the West for
244. Vietnam Risk Guide, supra note 101.
245. Id.
246. Currently, "10 American companies are among the 250 firms bidding to repair Vietnam's
dilapidated Highway 1, which links Hanoi in the north to Ho Chi Minh City [Saigon) in the south."
10 US Companies, supra note 242. The repair contract is worth $278.5 million and will be financed
by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Id.
247. Harish Mehta, Asian Companies Face Squeeze in Vietnam, Bus. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1994,
at 1.
248. Id.
249. David McDonald, The Nightly Business Report (broadcast Apr. 29, 1994). Another trade
show was scheduled for November 1994; more than 100 U.S. companies are expected to attend.
Id.; see also Philippe Agret, US Embargo: Myth and Reality, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Feb. 3,
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
250. Birth of a Tiger Cub, BANKER, June 1993, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allows
File. According to the Vietnam Investment Review, the five largest investing countries in Vietnam
as of April 1993 were:
Total Capital Invested
Country Number of Projects in US$ (millions)
Taiwan 77 1,115
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advanced technology, particularly in the area of oil exploration. 25' Now that the
Vietnamese Government has finally abandoned the Soviet economic model and
has committed to the pursuit of a free market economy, investments of American
money, technology, and managerial skill promise to be mutually beneficial to
the U.S. investor and Vietnam alike. 52 Investment in Vietnam will provide U.S.
corporations and individuals an opportunity to compete for the many contracts
that are sure to arise from Vietnam's emerging economy. Finally, these companies
and individuals will have the advantage of establishing themselves in a growing
marketplace that may very well be the next booming "Asian Tiger" economy.
B. DISADVANTAGES TO INVESTING IN VIETNAM
A glance at the other side of the coin reveals that while Vietnam may offer many
opportunities for investment advantageous to a foreign investor, investing in Viet-
nam may have some pitfalls as well. Technically, Vietnam boasts one of the largest
economies in Southeast Asia; however, between 70 to 85 percent of that economic
output is based on agriculture.253 Therefore, the Vietnamese will necessarily expe-
rience some difficulty in the transition from a primarily agricultural economy to
one based more heavily on manufacturing and service industries.2"
251. International Relationships, supra note 100; see also Rogers, supra note 174. Dr. Nguyen
Mai, Vice-Chairman of the SCCI, stated that "Vietnam also hoped U.S. technology would be available
in building pipelines to bring oil and gas to shore from its fields off the southeast coast." Id. However,
due to the U.S. embargo, South Korea's Hyundai heavy industries is currently building Vietnam's
first gas pipeline. Id.
252. Undeveloped nations such as Vietnam stand to benefit from Western influence through trans-
fers in technology and managerial expertise, which should eventually lead to a more productive
domestic economy and a higher standard of living.
253. Vietnam Risk Guide, supra note 101. The 1991 estimate of agriculture based output was
85 % compared to the 1993 estimate of 70 %. Id. This disparity may be explained by different survey
methods, but more likely is an indication of an increase in population movement toward industrial
and service-related occupations.
254. McDermott, supra note 2. Dr. Oanh describes the reform as follows:
What you have here is a change from a command economy to a market economy. It
is not just a shift. It is a revolution in itself. It's a very tall order, especially when
you don't have the personnel to take care of it. Everything was driven from the top
down. There was no business at all, frankly speaking. Then suddenly, everything is
possible. They throw you in the contest, you either sink or swim.
Here, down in the south, it is easier for us to catch on. The north is like a bird
that has been locked in a cage its whole life. You open the cage and he doesn't know
what to do. ...
The colonial heritage of almost 100 years has left the country with a primitive
agricultural sector, and bare of any provisions for industrialization. Burdened with
a legacy of a 40-year-long war for independence, the starting point for economic
reconstruction is necessarily low. As it stands today, Vietnam is still basically an
agricultural country where over 80 percent of the population live in rural areas, sup-
ported by farming, forestry and fishery. Energy shortages, a badly damaged transport
and communication system, scarcity of raw materials, and most of all, mismanagement
of the economy have severely constrained growth and development.
Id.
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More importantly, the Vietnamese Government will be faced with the difficult
task of managing this change. In 1991 the Soviet flag was lowered from its
embassy in Hanoi for the last time.255 Until 1989 the Soviet Union had accounted
for three-quarters of Vietnam's trade and most of its economic aid.256 Today,
Vietnamese officials point to the former Soviet Union, noting the chaos that
occurs when political reform takes place ahead of economic reform. "The formula
in Vietnam is to carry out economic reform first."'257 Therefore, in order to avoid
the kind of tragedy that has occurred in the Soviet Union and in China's Tiananmen
Square, Vietnamese political and military leadership must exercise extreme cau-
tion in plotting a course that combines tight political control with economic liberal-
ization. To date, no socialist country, with the possible exception of South Korea,
has successfully maintained the delicate balance between these diametrically op-
posed objectives.258
A major concern for foreign investors is the ominous presence of the Commu-
nist Party and its role in the Vietnamese economy. Despite passing the liberal
1987 FIL and a new constitution in 1991,259 the Vietnamese Government continues
to play a role in the major sectors of the economy. 260 Although the Vietnam
Communist Party has gradually accepted these and other democratic reforms,
the current structure of the government still enables the party to exercise its
political power and lead the country. 26' For example, even those governmental
positions that are designed to share power with the Communist Party are often
filled by its members.262 There is currently no law in place that would prevent
the Vietnamese Communist Party from securing the nomination and election of
255. Poole, supra note 93.
256. Id.
257. Id.; see also Vietnam Risk Guide, supra note 101. The political and economic upheaval in
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union has not yet reached Vietnam. Instead, the country's leaders
have apparently turned to China as their new role model. Unfortunately, like the old guard leadership
in China, Communist leaders in Vietnam have opted for gradual economic reform, while maintaining
a tight grip on political power. Id. However, even in the absence of any significant opposition,
political reform remains an acute necessity in Vietnam because economic liberalization has far out-
paced political reform. Id. This, in turn, raises the prospect of another " 'china situation,' where
the failure of political reform to keep pace with economic reform culminates in social unrest and
the loss of years of potential progress." Id.
258. Id.
259. Ngo, supra note 122, at 81.
The new Vietnamese Constitution, passed in April 1991, nominally reduces the power of
the Vietnam[ese] Communist Party (VCP) by enhancing the power of chief government
officials and the National Assembly. The Constitution strengthens the power of the Prime
Minister, who can now appoint and dismiss his cabinet; the power of the President, who
can for the first time nominate candidates for Prime Minister, dismiss the Prime Minister
and appoint the Chief Justice; and the power of the National Assembly, which is empow-
ered to enact laws and decrees that must pass on the house floor.ld.
260. Fact Sheet, supra note 224.
261. Ngo, supra note 122, at 81.
262. Id.
VOL. 28, NO. 4
UNITED STATES AND VIETNAM 1031
hand-picked candidates as prime minister or president.263 As a result, even though
the Communist Party no longer directly controls the government, 2 4 it nonetheless
maintains significant influence in the Vietnamese political system.
Even though some of Vietnam's leading reformers have managed to gain posi-
tions of considerable power, their authority is unlikely to command much influ-
ence over the older, more conservative members of the government. 265 Therefore,
even though Vietnam has taken steps toward capitalism through its doi moi policy
of economic renovation, the country is unlikely to experience any sweeping
democratic reforms in the near future. 26 "Communism runs deep in the hearts
of many Vietnamese who fought and suffered for Vietnam's unification. To fully
abandon communism and embrace capitalism and democracy would be to admit
that the decades of fighting for independence from foreign dominion were in
vain. "267 These perceptions serve to bolster the authority of the Vietnamese
Communist Party and account for the Communists' consequent domination of
governmental power in Vietnam; the influence of the Party is unlikely to fade
quickly.268
In addition, the Vietnamese military remains an obstacle to reform. While the
role of the military has diminished, its senior officers remain a conservative force
in the country and will ensure that the reformers do not proceed with economic
liberalization at too fast a pace. 26 9 Due to Vietnam's withdrawal from Cambodia
and the easing of tension along its border with China, the size and influence of
the Vietnamese military has steadily declined. 270 Nevertheless, Vietnam's four
million veterans continue to be a powerful conservative force in Vietnamese
271
society.
In refusing political reform, the Vietnamese face the possibility of civil unrest
similar to that which occurred in China, where political reform did not accompany
economic liberalization.272 The Communist Party, however, truly believes that
it can successfully bring about economic freedom without sacrificing its firm
263. Id.
264. Id. The Vietnamese Communist Party used to make all governmental decisions and impose
them on the people. Currently, all decision-making power is vested with the Vietnamese parliament.
Id.
265. Vietnam Risk Guide, supra note 101. "Political power resides collectively in the Politburo.
This makes the process of change a much slower process, though at the same time, collective rule
also means there are no wild swings in policy as aging leaders pass away." Id.
266. Ngo, supra note 122, at 81.
267. Id. at 81-82. "Both the general population and the VCP [Vietnamese Communist Party]
itself consider the Communists as a party of patriots and freedom fighters who liberated Vietnam."
Id.
268. Ngo, supra note 122, at 82.
269. Vietnam Risk Guide, supra note 101. Some senior officers in the Vietnamese military warn
"that too much attention to economic development could 'hurt the thinking and feelings of those
who have taken up weapons.' " Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Ngo, supra note 122, at 82.
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political control.273 As a result, potential foreign investors remain aware that
Vietnam could at any time be stricken with the same political upheaval that
hampered China's attempt at a similar policy of "market socialism." Despite
the guarantees in the 1987 FIL against nationalization of foreign invested capital,
foreign investors may not be willing to risk vital assets because of the possibility
that Vietnam could suddenly withdraw its current liberal economic policy in
order to preserve its socialist government.274
Accordingly, the Vietnamese Government maintains some laws counterproduc-
tive to the goal of doi moi or economic revitalization. The initial approval process
mandated by the 1987 FIL, which is required before the commencement of any
foreign investment activity, is a prime example of how maintaining communism
in Vietnam may take precedence over economic development.2 7' This initial ap-
proval process "affords the government the opportunity to carefully scrutinize
each application, approving only those investments which it decides will improve
the economy without undermining the control of the Communist Party.' ,2 76 Unfor-
tunately, the procedure also creates delays, generates excessive bureaucracy, and
increases the opportunity for governmental corruption.2 7  As a result, a provision
intended to provide political security for the Communist Party may actually under-
mine Vietnam's efforts to attract the foreign investment critical to its economic
revival. 278
A variety of other internal problems can be expected in a country that has
experienced as much conflict and internal strife as Vietnam. For example, Viet-
nam's infrastructure is quite poor, particularly in the north, where roads and
bridges were bombed by the United States and either left to decay or rebuilt
cheaply by the Soviets.2 79 The ports and railways of Vietnam are also in poor
273. Id.
274. Id. "The possibility that one's investment of time, money, and effort could be lost at the
whim of the VCP [Vietnamese Communist Party] should be carefully considered by even the most
optimistic investor." Id. However, by observing the mistakes made by the Soviets and the Chinese,
the Vietnamese Government has the benefit of learning from its comrades' mistakes. In addition,
the Vietnamese Government, including most of its Communist members, appears to have realized
the limitations and dangers of a centrally controlled economy, and are committed to economic reform.
Such reform should provide the opportunity for the Vietnamese Government to gradually liberalize
its political system.
275. See generally 1987 FIL, supra note 123.
276. Ngo, supra note 122, at 70.
277. Government corruption is an increasing problem in Vietnam due in part to the low salaries
of governmental employees, as well as an increase in opportunities for corrupt behavior such as the
approval of foreign investment proposals. Id. at 81; see also Philip Shenon, Vietnam Moves from
Clenched Fists to Greased Palms, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1993, at E13. Since the early 1980s, nearly
20,000 state employees have been jailed or disciplined for corrupt activities, and in January 1993
corruption was made punishable by death. Id. "[T]he corruption problem is now so serious that,
by warping the government's decision-making process, it could undermine the free-market reforms
that are promising to bring billions of dollars in foreign investment." Id.
278. Ngo, supra note 122, at 81.
279. Id. at 82.
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condition, which makes the internal distribution of goods difficult and hinders
foreign trade.280 Furthermore, communication systems are primitive and defi-
cient,2"' and electrical shortages and "brownouts" are routine.282
Moreover, in order to carry out the plan for revitalizing its economy, Vietnam
was forced to restructure and renovate its monetary and banking system.283 Prior
to 1990 the banking sector was controlled by the government; it was seen as a
"vehicle [to be] used to distribute resources in sectors that the Government
believed were politically important."28 The role of foreign banks was increased
dramatically, however, when the State Bank of Vietnam granted tentative ap-
proval for foreign banks to establish branch offices.285 Unfortunately, many of
the thirty-eight foreign banks already operating in Vietnam have been reluctant
to participate in large-scale, high-risk infrastructure projects.286 One reason for the
reluctance of foreign banks is Vietnam's inadequate legal system. 287 In addition,
Vietnamese auditing and accounting standards are poor, providing a major hin-
drance to foreign banks and investment firms that want to value the assets of a
local partner before committing resources to a joint venture.2 8 Nevertheless,
although these problems may be currently slowing down business in Vietnam,
their existence will create opportunities in legal services, banking, and account-
ing, as the demand for these services continues to grow.
Some of the other problems facing Vietnam include six to twelve million people
unemployed in a workforce of thirty-two million; population growth that is among
the highest in the world at 2.2 percent per year; and per-capita income that is
among the lowest in the world at just around $200 per year.2 89 As of 1991 the
280. Vietnam Risk Guide, supra note 101.
281. McDermott, supra note 2. Currently in Vietnam, there is only one telephone for every 435
people. Id.
282. Id.
283. Vietnam's Goal, supra note 172. In May 1991, the Vietnamese Government implemented
regulations governing foreign banks, which allowed those banks to open branches in Vietnam. Id.
The regulations also permit foreign banks to enter into joint ventures with Vietnamese banks. Id.;
see also Nikolaus Prede, Marx's Masterpiece Gathering Dust as Vietnam Flirts with Capitalism,
GAZETTE (Montreal), Jan. 4, 1992. In desperate need of reforming its underdeveloped banking
system and credit mechanism, Vietnam has turned to Germany, which recently resumed official
economic aid to Hanoi and will be supporting efforts in the banking sector. Id.
284. Mark Evans Completes His Look at Vietnam Now That the US Embargo Has Been Lifted,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 14, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
285. Id.
286. Id. The Vietnamese Government wants foreign banks to be more active, but may be too
optimistic about their willingness to commit capital to much needed projects. "It [the Vietnamese
Government) looks at foreign banks as a means of funneling investment into the country-pure and
simple. That comes from the lack of understanding of the role of commercial banks in a market
economy." Id.
287. Id. For example, "[tlhe lack of concise property laws causes a significant problem because
they do not provide clear title to collateral or methods to value collateral as a distressed asset. This
leaves banks uncertain about where they stand on foreclosures." Id. As with the 1987 FIL, the
uncertainty that stems from ambiguous laws should be a primary focus of Vietnamese officials.
288. Id.
289. McDermott, supra note 2.
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outlook was bleak for the Vietnamese economy as its government estimated that
35 percent of the state-owned enterprises were financially inoperative, another
20 percent were improving but still unable to pay taxes, thus leaving only 45
percent of state-owned Vietnamese enterprises operating at a profit.'9 However,
even those enterprises operating at a profit were experiencing difficulties due to
the unavailability of capital and basic industrial raw materials. 29'
Yet, even in the face of these serious domestic problems and the U.S. embargo,
Vietnam seems somehow to be winning its battle for economic reform. Despite
losing $1.5 billion a year in aid from the former Soviet Union, the Vietnamese
economy grew by more than 8 percent in 1992.292 Inflation was restrained to a
relatively low rate of 18 percent in 1992, as compared to inflation as high as 30
percent in the past, and the Vietnamese Government expects further reductions
in inflation in the future.293 In addition, Vietnamese agriculture is going through
a renaissance. In 1987, the people suffered from starvation; in 1992, food produc-
tion reached 23 million tons; and in 1993, Vietnam became the world's third
largest exporter of rice.294 Most importantly, foreign investment increased 75
percent from 1991 to 1992, and by March of 1993 Vietnam had granted 619
licenses for foreign investment.295 As a result, while problems do exist, Vietnam
remains an enormous source of economic potential and a nation on the verge of
joining the world's industrialized community.
V. Why Both Countries Will Benefit Without the Embargo
The debate over whether the United States should lift its embargo against
Vietnam was basically a polar argument between economics and politics. On
290. Vietnam Risk Guide, supra note 101.
291. Id. A typical analysis of the bleak economic situation in 1991 was as follows:
Viet Nam is losing its established markets in Eastern Europe as they shift their economic
focus more towards the West. Eastern Europe has not only been a prime market for
such products as clothing, footwear and handicrafts, but also a key labor market for
thousands of Vietnamese workers. With unemployment soaring in such nations as
Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, many Vietnamese workers are being sent home.
Not surprisingly, the reduction in aid and trade from the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe has dampened economic activity, reversing a generally improving trend since
1989. The government is struggling to control the budget deficit, which after improving
in 1990, is expected to reach roughly 16% of GDP this year. Inflation, which raged
out of control until 1989, has begun to climb again, rising by 100% in the first quarter
of this year. Inflation is being stoked by rising gasoline and fertilizer prices, which
have doubled from a year ago. A superb rice harvest, triggering a near doubling in
rice prices, has also contributed to inflationary pressures.
Id.
292. McDermott, supra note 2.
293. Id.
294. Id. Rice exports rose by 30% in the first half of 1993 as compared with the same period
in 1992. The rice exports totaled 780,000 tons, nearly half of which came from the Mekong River
Delta area. Vietnam Risk Guide, supra note 101.
295. Vietnam Interested in More Investment in Minerals, Coal, Delegation Head Says, INT'L
TRADE REP., May 12, 1993, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, Intrad File.
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the one hand, the strong economic argument that the United States needed to
expand its markets in the increasingly global community supported the position
of abandoning the embargo and thereby opening up trade with Vietnam. On
the other hand, Washington faced considerable political pressure to maintain
an embargo on Vietnam as America's "enemy." While those opposed to lifting
the embargo on trade with Vietnam represented a smaller percentage of the
populace, they were nonetheless resolute in their stance. To the hundreds of
thousands of American Vietnam veterans, Vietnam remains an emotionally
charged subject.
The other side of the argument, however, in favor of lifting the embargo against
Vietnam altogether, gained overwhelming support for reasons both economic
and political in nature. These reasons included the recent changes in the makeup
of geopolitical power and methods of worldwide trade. For example, the breakup
of the Soviet Union has sent shock waves throughout the world with varying
results.296 Many countries, including Vietnam, that were once dependent upon the
Soviets for economic as well as military aid, must now seek out new international
partners for trade. This search for new partners is manifest in Vietnam's recent
efforts to attract foreign investment by converting to a "market socialism" econ-
omy and the adoption of the 1987 FIL.
Moreover, changes in attitudes in the United States and abroad have produced
a more global outlook on foreign policy and trade strategy. However, instead
of a new world order, it appears that the states possessing power and wealth will
group together in order to better compete with their rivals and better protect their
assets.297 The formation of regional trade alliances such as the EEC and the
NAFTA bring to bear the growing possibility of an Asian Economic Commu-
nity.298 Once these kinds of trade alliances are formed, nonmember nations will
find it increasingly difficult to gain access to those markets and take advantage
of the economic opportunities therein. 29 With respect to Vietnam, according to
one U.S. legislator,
(w]hen dealing from isolation, we achieve nothing. When dealing directly, we saw
progress. Our trade embargo no longer denies Vietnam of goods and services, it only
296. Some of the newly independent Eastern European nations such as Poland and Hungary now
seek to bolster their economic and political freedom by applying for membership in the EEC and
NATO. Others seek to establish their fledgling economies as the struggle for power and political
leadership continues in Russia. In Czechoslovakia, however, the freedom from Soviet oppression
has merely provided an opportunity to resume an ancient civil war involving the Bosnians, the
Serbians, and the Croatians.
297. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, OUT OF CONTROL 206-08 (1993).
298. Vietnam will soon seek membership in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
which has said it will admit Vietnam into the six-member group when Hanoi achieves economic
parity with its capitalist neighbors. Mervin Nambiar, ASEAN Toasts End to US Embargo on Vietnam,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Feb. 4, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
299. See generally RICHARD NIXON, SEIZE THE MOMENT (1992) (speaking on the need for the
United States to establish itself in global markets).
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denies Vietnam of American goods and services. In this day of growing trade deficits and
high unemployment, it makes little sense to keep America out of promising markets. 300
These considerations are currently of heightened importance in light of the dispute
brewing between the United States and Japan over trade practices. 3 ' Therefore
by lifting the embargo, the United States is able not only to provide the opportunity
for its corporations to compete in a growing market, but also to establish economic
ties in Southeast Asia that may someday become very important and far more
difficult to obtain.
From the political side of the argument, the Vietnam War ended nearly twenty
years ago. Why then, should the United States have maintained for so long such
a wartime-like stance with respect to Vietnam? Granted, during the war the
Vietnamese may have committed some unconscionable acts toward its enemies-
as did some Americans. One must remember, however, that first, it was war,
and secondly, for the Vietnamese it was a civil war in which they were fighting
for their independence and defending their own soil. Furthermore, the United
States does not maintain such economic restrictions on Japan or Germany. Those
two nations were the evil enemies in World War II and committed such atrocities
as Nazi concentration camps and Japanese kamikaze attacks. Yet the United
States does not, at least not outwardly, continue to hold these acts against those
nations. Germany and Japan represent two of the United States' largest trading
partners and both, incidentally, are heavily involved in investment and trade with
Vietnam.
With respect to the American agenda of freeing the world from the oppression
and tyranny of communism, history has proven that greater cooperation, as op-
posed to political pressure and economic sanctions, is often the surest means of
achieving a national goal.302 In attempting to realize its goal of spreading democ-
racy and peace, the best course of action for the United States is increased involve-
ment in Vietnam by way of improved economic and political relations. In addition,
now that the embargo has been lifted, the cooperation between the United States
300. Murkowski Offers Legislation Lifting Vietnam Trade Embargo, INT'L TRADE REP., Apr. 7,
1993, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, Intrad File.
301. Collision Course; Confrontation Looms as Japan Persists with Trade Barriers, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 27, 1994, at D1.
America's frustration peaked this month, as the latest round of trade talks collapsed
after eight months. President Clinton put U.S. prestige on the line, raising the specter
of a trade war with tough talk about sanctions and quotas. A new government report
underscored the stakes: America's merchandise trade deficit with Japan grew to nearly
$60 billion, a record.
Id.
302. See generally WALTER ISAACSON, KISSINGER 611-21 (1992) (discussing the failed attempt
by the United States to force the Soviet Union to allow more Jews to emigrate by imposing economic
sanctions).
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and Vietnam with respect to the POW/MIA issue should continue 30 3 as both
nations work toward normalized relations and eventual most favored nation status
for Vietnam. Vietnam will then once again become a nation and not a war, and
both countries will benefit.
Finally, perhaps the best indication that the Vietnam War has finally ended
is the fact that the "Cola War" has reached Vietnam. To celebrate the lifting
of the embargo, the Coca-Cola company displayed a thirty-foot inflatable replica
of its soft drink bottle to serve as the centerpiece of a party at the Ho Chi Minh
City Concert Hall. 304 Not to be outdone, Pepsico inflated a giant Pepsi can in
the middle of a Ho Chi Minh City square and gave complimentary cans of their
product to passers-by.0 5 Thus, the lifting of the U.S. embargo will surely prove
advantageous for American business as well as forward efforts to account for
those U.S. servicemen still missing since the war. Equally important will be the
effect it will have on the people of Vietnam, leading to the hope that the "Cola
War" will be the only war that the younger generation of Vietnamese will ever
experience.
303. On June 7, 1994, the U.S. military sent home 16 sets of servicemen's remains recovered
by search teams or handed in by Vietnamese villagers. John Rogers, U.S. Sends Home MIA Remains,
Plans Vietnam Talks, REUTERS WORLD SERVICE, June 7, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library,
Allwld File. The recovery was the largest since the joint U.S. and Vietnamese task force was formed
in 1992. Id.
304. Business Leaders, supra note 14.
305. Firms Leap into Booming Vietnam, PRESS Ass'N NEWSFILE, Feb. 4, 1994, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File.
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